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Erratum 
The third sentence of footnote 17a on page 19 which read: It is submitted that the effect of making such 
negotiability possible is not just the creation of a negotiable chose in action, such as the share in the 
company, by means of the transfer of the share certificate, a situation already recognized in the N.I.L. 
should have read: 
It is submitted that the effect of making such negotiability possible is not just the creation of a negotiable 
share certificate, but the creation of a negotiable chose in action, such as the share in the company, by 
means of the transfer of the share certificate, a situation already recognized in the N.I.L. 
In footnote 70 on page 14 the word "test" should read: "text." 
In footnote 76 on page 15 the term "English court" should read: "English corporation." 
This leading article is available in Buffalo Law Review: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/
vol11/iss1/3 
INVESTMENT SECURITIES UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
EGON GUTTMAN*
C OMMERCIAL necessity has long been chafing under the restrictions
which the formal requirements of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act"
have placed upon the negotiability of investment securities. 2 These formal
requirements have excluded from negotiability many forms of financing; whilst
uncertainty remains to shroud others. 3 Attempted amelioration of the situation
has been piecemeal and has covered only restricted fields of corporate financing.
4
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code seeks to fill in these lacunae and
to introduce "a negotiable instrument law dealing with securities."5
Recognizing that the formal requirements adopted by the N.I.L.6 may be
apposite to short term credit devicesr but not to instruments evidencing long
term investments,8 the Code gives effect to the fundamental commercial ap-
proach which would differentiate between a payment device and an investment
security. Thus, although an instrument may comply with the formal require-
ments of the law relating to Commercial Paper (Article 3 of the Uniform
Commercial Code), instruments falling within the functional and formal
definition of Article 8 are excluded from that part of the Uniform Commercial
Code.9
The definition adopted by Article 8 to describe an "investment security"
is mainly a functional one. It requires that a security shall be "commonly
dealt in upon securities exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any
* LL.B., LL.M., of the Middle Temple Barrister at Law, Assistant Professor of Law,
University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. A full section by section analysis of
Article 8 prepared by the writer is published in "Study of the Uniform Commercial Code,"
1960, Soney & Sage Co., Newark, N.J.
1. 5 Uniform Laws Annotated, hereinafter in the text referred to as N.I.L.
2. E.g., stock certificates, script certificates, bonds payable to registered holders and
other certificates evidencing long term financing referred to as "securities generally." See
also Robotham v. Prudential Insurance Company of America, 64 N.J. Eq. 673, 53 Atl. 842,
847 (Ct. Ch. 1903) (Stevenson, V.C.) and Una v. Dodd, 39 N.J. Eq. 173, 186 (Ct. Ch.
1884) (Van Fleet, V.C.).
3. E.g., the position of "interim certificates" is not settled in New Jersey. New
York, until the passing of the Hofstadter Act (Personal Property Law § 260 et seq. and
§ 186 et seq.) was bound by the decision in Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 150
N.E. 594 (1926), while Ohio followed Hoppel v. Cleveland Discount Co., 25 Ohio App.
138, 157 N.E. 414 (1927). Also consider the market upset caused by the unpublished
opinion in Pulaski County v. Ben Hur Life Association of Crawfordsville, reconsidered:
286 Ky. 119, 149 S.W.2d 738 (1941).
4. E.g., Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 6 U.L.A. Also many Government and Municipal
Bonds have been declared negotiable by the statutes authorizing their issue, e.g., N.J.S.A.
40: 1-29, L. 1957 c. 10 § 1.
5. Official Comments to Section 8-101 Uniform Commercial Code. Section 8-105 re-
iterates this intention in a formal enactment of negotiability, setting out presumptions re-
garding signatures, required to establish negotiability.
6. 5 U.L.A. § 1.
7. These short term credit devices are in effect payment devices.
8. See supra note 2.
9. Section 8-102(1) (b).
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area in which it is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment."' 0 By adopt-
ing such a functional definition, this Article avoids the pitfalls of the N.I.L.
and follows the policy embodied in the English Bills of Exchange Act, 1882,11
which enables the custom of merchants to develop new negotiable instruments
as commercial necessity arises, i.e., common law negotiability.12
A difficulty is raised by this functional definition in that it may result
in an instrument originally non-negotiable achieving the status of negotiability
as a result of being "dealt in" as such in "any area." This is, however, rarely
the case, since most laws will let the place of issue govern negotiability, 1"
while Section 8-106 refers to the place of organization of the issuer as govern-
ing the validity of the security and the rights and duties of the issuer. Al-
though these two places are not necessarily the same, a reference to these
laws should prevent negotiability being imposed on instruments not intended
to have such status.
It is to be regretted, however, that in addition to the functional require-
ments contained in the definition of an investment security, certain formalistic
requirements should also have been found desirable. Thus the security must
be "issued in bearer or registered form." This would exclude the order but
.non-registerable bond, which would have to seek to qualify for negotiability
under Article 3 (Commercial Paper) which requires that it contain "no other
promise.' 14
Whether an instrument is in bearer form depends not on any indorsement,
but on the form in which it has been issued. 15 Similarly, the fact that the
security is in registered form will have to be apparent from the face thereof.10
The difficulty caused by these formal requirements is that it may negate the
lead shown by the functional definition. Thus, despite practice which may
result in certain instruments being dealt with as "media of investments," Article
8 may not become applicable merely because an instrument runs to order
rather than to a bearer or to a registered holder. The exclusion of these in-
struments is a policy decision, the reasons for which are not apparent.
The Uniform Commercial Code does not attempt to cover all the law
relating to investment securities. It is not concerned with the fundamental
validity of a security, except to recognize the invalidity of an overissue.17
Questions of validity are left to be determined, inter alia, by the relevant
10. Section 8-102(1) (a) (ii) note--"a medium of investment" is not necessarily a
"secure investment." See Una v. Dodd, supra note 2. Its purpose is that it "may produce a
revenue."
11. 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61.
12. Edelstein v. Schuler & Co., [19021 2 K.B. 144, 154-156 (Bigham, J.).
13. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 348.
14. Uniform Commercial Code § 3-104.
15. Section 8-102(1) (a) (i) and (d). I.e., it is not possible by an indorsement in blank
to change an instrument payable to order into an investment security payable to bearer.
16. Id. and (c).
17. Section 8-104.
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Corporation Laws'8 and Blue Sky Laws.19 The Code is intended to make
provisions for the ready and easy transfer of investment securities dispensing
with excessive investigation of questions of title. In this respect many states
have already taken steps to ease the difficulties introduced by the unfortunate
dictum of Chief Justice Taney in Lowery v. Commercial & Farmers Trust
Company.20 The provisions of the Code are wider than any steps taken so
far and are not confined to those situations where the existence of fiduciaries
has been the cause of complications.
In connection with the transfer of registered securities, 21 two important
questions arise. The first concerns the validity of the transfer, i.e., an attack
claiming the transfer to be void, e.g., due to signatures being unauthorized or
forged. The form of protection afforded in this case by signature guarantees,
22
satisfactory evidence of appointment of a person attempting to effectuate a
transfer on behalf of an estate or settlement,2 3 etc., is adhered to without
great objection by the participating parties. Another story surrounds the
problem of transfers where there is a fiduciary duty imposed by a testator
or settlor. Here English law indicates that a corporation is under no duty
to inquire as to the rightfulness of a particular transfer.24 This rule, which
became established in the English Common Law at an early stage,2 5 was later
embodied in the statute laws of England2 6 and was, at first, also adopted in
the United States.27 An issuer could thus transfer to a fiduciary and could
thereafter transfer on the instructions of such fiduciary, without inquiring as
to the rightfulness of the transfer. If asked to transfer by one named as a
fiduciary, the only requirement was for the issuer to satisfy himself that the
request came from a fiduciary duly constituted as such and not whether the
transfer itself was rightful.
In 1848, however, a dictum of Chief Justice Taney28 set off a chain reac-
tion which made the transfer of securities a most hazardous and, as a result,
most expensive adventure. Referring to the corporate issuer of investment
securities, Taney, C.J., stated that it was ". . . the custodian of the shares
of stock, and clothed with power sufficient to protect the rights of everyone
interested, from unauthorized transfers; it is a trust placed in the hands of
18. E.g., NJ.SA. 14: 8-1 et seq.
19. E.g., NJ.SA. 49: 1-1 et seq. and 49: 2-1 et seq.
20. 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (1848).
21. I.e., securities the transfer of which involves an entry in the books of the issuer.
Thus there is here a contact with the issuer, which is absent in the case of a security
transferable by mere delivery, i.e., a bearer security.
22. Section 8-312(1).
23. Section 8-402.
24. Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 117.
25. Hartga v. Bank of England, 3 Ves. Jun. 56, 30 Eng. Rep. 891 (Ch. 1796).
26. Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict. c. 16, § 20. See now
Companies Act, 1948, supra note 24.
27. Bank of Virginia v. Craig, 50 Va. (6 Leigh) 399 (1835); Hutchins v. State Bank,
47 Mass. (12 Metc.) 421 (1847).
28. Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers Trust Co., 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (1848).
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the corporation for the protection of individual interests, and like every other
trustee, it is bound to execute the trust with proper diligence and care, and
is responsible for any injury sustained by its negligence or misconduct." 29
Holding that wills are registered public documents, the learned Chief Justice
came to the conclusion that a corporation transferring a security contrary to
a will would be liable in breach of trust.
Much litigation followed the adoption of this rule. Finally a procedure
was devised which, it was felt, would give the necessary amount of protection
to transfer agents. But the price paid for this procedure is a high one and
is paid by the estate trying to transfer the security.30
Instead of placing the responsibility and any subsequent loss where it
should lie, i.e., the property of testators or settlors who have placed a trust
in their respective executors or trustees, the law places a duty to police such
fiduciaries on the transfer agents and on the corporation. These in turn have
passed on the risk, in the form of high transfer charges, which in many in.
stances border on the exorbitant.3' A change of this approach can only come
about by the Supreme Court overruling the Taney doctrine32 or by statutory
intervention. The Uniform Law Commissioner, when recommending statutory
intervention, felt the English approach to be too broad and imprecise. As a
result various statutes were drafted which attempted to exonerate the transfer
agent by indicating the precise steps he would have to follow to avoid liability
for a transfer in breach of a fiduciary duty.
Of the various statutes which have been drafted on this subject, the most
important were the Uniform Fiduciary Act, 33 the Model Fiduciaries Securities
Transfer Act,34 and the Uniform Act for Simplification of Fiduciary Security
Transfers. 5 All these enactments suffer from one major defect. They have
not been adopted generally, so that in many cases it is still encumbent upon
a transfer agent to demand additional items of proof. In addition, the Uniform
Fiduciary Act is limited to securities registered in the name of the fiduciary
29. Id. at 1047.
30. In the typical case of a deceased shareholder, the executor signs the power
of attorney printed on the back of the share certificate, gets a bank or broker to
guarantee the signature, obtains a waiver signed by the appropriate inheritance
tax official, and gets the clerk of the probate court to issue a certificate that the
executor has qualified and has not been removed. With these documents, under
the Taney doctrine, the executor is ordinarily required by the transfer agent to
supply a certified copy of the will; many transfer agents will demand a court
order in addition to or instead of the will. When the documents are received by
the transfer agent, they are carefully examined and often additional documents,
such as affidavits from the heirs, are then demanded.
Braucher, Security Transfers by Fiduciaries, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 193, 194 (1958).
31. It has been estimated that a transfer costs an estate or trust a minimum of ap-
proximately $30. Conard, Simplifying Securities Transfers, 30 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 33, 34
(1957).
32. Since in most commercial cases there is no Federal question involved, such over-
ruling is most unlikely to occur.
33. 9B U.L.A. adopted in New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 3A: 41-1 et seq.
34. Adopted in Connecticut, Delaware and Illinois.
35. Adopted in New Jersey, N.J.S.A. 14:18-1 et seq.
INVESTMENT SECURITIES UNDER UCC
and thus is inapplicable to those cases where protection is really needed, i.e.,
where the security is registered in the name of a decedent, or where the
security, to the knowledge of the transfer agent, is registered in the name
of a nominee.30
Great uncertainty surrounds the question of "knowledge" of facts that
the transfer is in breach of a fiduciary duty. At present, transfer agents re-
quire an indemnity to protect themselves.3'7 The fact that both the transfer
agent and the corporation have to be satisfied with the indemnity makes it
extremely rare that such an indemnity would be accepted from a private
executor or trustee.
The latest attempt in this direction, The Uniform Act for Simplification
of Fiduciary Security Transfers in amending the Uniform Fiduciary Act, is not
as comprehensive as the Uniform Commercial Code.38 Although not completely
clearing the trust from the record of the corporation, 9 Article 8 limits the
proof which can be demanded by a transfer agent and protects him on com-
pliance with its provisions.4" The primary advantage of Article 8 lies in the
fact that it is integrated in the comprehensive coverage of Commercial Law
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code and not just another bit of piece-
meal legislation. It is to be hoped that the provisions of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code will be adopted in all jurisdictions of the United States, so as
to eliminate the difficulty a variety of laws causes. It is also to be hoped
that transfer agents will rely on the provisions of the Code and will not insist
on further proofs so as to make the provisions of the Code a mere dead letter.
Writing in 1959, the Temporary Commission to Study and Report upon the
Uniform Commercial Code for the State of Connecticut stated that the 1952
draft of the Code adopted in Pennsylvania "achieved considerable success in
reducing demands for documentation in Philadelphia and little or none in
36. To deal with this problem N.J.S.A. 3A: 15-7 permits a corporate fiduciary to
keep securities in the name of a nominee without disclosing the fiduciary position; see
further Bogert, Trust Investment: Earmarking or Nominee?, 24 Texas L. Rev. 417 (1946).
37. The standard form of such indemnity is as follows:
The undersigned Bank requests that this transfer be made without its furnishing
supporting documents, and warrants the propriety of such transfer and agrees, in
any case where the uniform fiduciaries act does not or may not afford full pro-
tection for such transfer, fully to indemnify and hold harmless the corporation
and its transfer agent for any loss or cost, including counsel fees, which either
may suffer by reason thereof.
See Christy, The Transfer of Stock § 225 (3d ed. 1958).
38. For example, the Act is confined to "fiduciaries," [§ 1(d)] who are only one of
the group of "appropriate persons," [§ 8-308) who can indorse a security to transfer it.
See also the definition of "security" in Section 8-102 as opposed to that in Section 1(f)
of the Act. The essential similarity between the two has, however, been recognized. Thus,
the New York Transfer Association Rules, Rules I, II, and IV, prepared by F. T. Christy,
recognize conformity with either of these provisions as conformity with its own stringent
rules for transfers outside the State of New York.
39. See the English Companies Act, 1948, § 117:
No notice of any trust, express, implied or constructive, shall be entered on the
register or be receivable by the registrar, in the case of companies, registered in
England.
40. Section 8-402 and 8-404.
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Pittsburgh. A revised version of Article 8 in the Code which went into effect
in Massachusetts in 1958 is reported to have met with some success."'41 Some
inducement to make transfer agents cease their reactionary approach to the
simplification of transfers is indicated in Section 8-402, and a further induce-
ment would be a compulsory insurance in addition to the voluntary one taken
out by most transfer agents. Such compulsory insurance has existed in Eng-
land since 1891,42 and has proved a boon to transfer agents.
It is the purpose of this paper to consider some of the provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, Article 8, and to criticize those features of the
Article which, to the writer, appear to be in need of further consideration at
some future stage in the development of Commercial Law. Article 8 is divided
into four parts. Part 1 deals with general matters, definitions, etc.; Part 2
with the rights, duties and defences of the issuer of securities in relation to
the holder thereof; Part 3 sets out the provisions governing the purchase of
securities; and Part 4 regulates the registration of transfers.
II
It is of interest to note that the Code tackles a problem which has too
often been ignored in commercial statutes. It is the question of the choice
of law rule applicable in those situations which involve a conflict of laws. The
possibility of foreign securities being traded in Code states is realized and
an attempt is made by the Code to indicate a solution to the vexing problem
of applicable law.
Here the Code departs from the rigidity of absolute rules by conferring
upon the parties a freedom of choice of law, provided that the law chosen has
some contact with the transaction.' Beyond this freedom of choice, no real
interference with existing choice of law rules is attempted, for Section 1-105 (1)
states: "Failing such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an
appropriate relation to this state." There is no definition of what would be
such "appropriate relation," leaving this to be determined by the usual con-
flict of laws of each state. A court confronted with this provision should
bear in mind, however, that the purpose of the Code is to make the law
uniform. 2
In Article 8, the general choice of law rule of the Code is fitted to the
situations dealt with in that Article.8 Three problems have to be considered
here: (a) the validity of the security, (b) the rights and duties of the issuer
with respect to registration of transfers and (c) the transfer of the security
by negotiation. As to the first there can be no doubt that the law of the
41. Report of the Temporary Commission at page 48.
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place of the organization of the issuer will have to govern this question. It is
that law which will give legal status to the issuer and as such will govern his
ability to issue securities.4 When we come to examine the second problem, this
choice of law rule will once more appear appropriate. Two approaches exist in
the United States. The first considers the law of the place of transfer to be
effective; whereas, the second requires conformity with the place of organiza-
tion to effect a transfer. But whichever rule may be applied, the law of the
place of incorporation of the issuer will indicate the choice of law rule applicable
to the registration of transfers.5
Though this appears clear in relation to stock, a different rule may well
be required in relation to bonds, which evidence the indebtedness of a corpora-
tion. The law of incorporation may here have to compete with that govern-
ing the indebtedness, i.e., contract, and that governing the transfer of the debt.
The various rules which have been applied in these situations vary from the
lex loci contractus, the lex loci solutionis and the law having the closest con-
tact as the proper law of the contract to the lex actus as governing the transfer
of the obligations. Authority can be found in favour of all these laws. The
Code solves this problem by providing one uniform choice of law rule ap-
plicable to all investment securities,6 while preserving the right of the lex actus
to govern the negotiation of the securities. 7
It should be noted that the reference is not just to the law of the juris-
diction of organization of the issuer, but "including its conflict of laws rule."
This is a clear reference to the admission of a renvoi. Thus, if that law were
to refer back to, or on to, the law of the place of the transaction, such law
will be applied.8 The general approach in the United States has been to ignore
the conflict of laws of the law to which the court had been referred by its
choice of law rule.9 But certain cases, such as rights in land situated in a
foreign legal system, rights of shareholders to participate in a corporation,
etc., seem to require the application of a renvoi theory, so as to enable the
holder to realize his expectations. It is submitted that this reasoning is equally
applicable to securities governed by Article 8. Only by looking to the totality
4. See E. R. Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 137 (1955).
5. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 182 (1934); Uniform Act for Simplification of
Fiduciary Security Transfers § 8; Seymore v. National Biscuit Co., 107 F.2d 58 (3d Cir.
1939).
6. A. F. Conard, A New Deal for Fiduciaries Stock Transfers, 56 Mich. L. Rev. 843,
869 (1958).
7. Section 8-401. It is clear that within a Code-state, the transfer, if complying with
the provisions of Article 8, would be mandatory. The fact that the security is made ne-
gotiable by the Code indicates that the place of transfer governs. It will then be for the
seller to assist the buyer to obtain registration of the transfer in accordance with the law
of the place of organization of the issuer. Section 8-316.
8. The various renvoi theories have received considerable criticism. E.g., Lorenzen,
The Renvoi Doctrine, 27 Yale L.J. 509 (1918), but see Cowan, Renvoi Does Not Involve
a Logical Fallacy, 87 U. Pa. L. Rev. 34 (1938). For a full discussion of the problem, see
Dicey, Conflict of Laws (7th ed. Morris) 1958.
9. Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 7 (1934); In re Tallmadge, 109 Misc. 696, 181
N.Y. Supp. 336 (Surr. Ct. 1919).
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of the foreign law will it be possible to determine the rights of the holder of
a security. To enforce such security it may be necessary ultimately to proceed
against the assets of the issuer himself and these would normally be in the
place of original organization of the issuer.10 A full determination of rights
will prevent the unnecessary expenditure involved in an attempt to enforce
rights not recognized by the relevant foreign forum.
In the realm of negotiable instruments, the terms "maker," "drawer,"
"acceptor," "accommodation party" are familiar to us. However, the U.C.C.
in Article 8 introduces a new term, the "issuer."" Defining an "issuer" as
including a person who places or permits the placing of his name on a security
to evidence that it represents a share in his property or an obligation on him
as represented by the security, Section 8-201 indicates the person who would
be subject to the obligations imposed by the Article on the issuer and who
would be able to avail himself of the defences granted therein to the issuer.
The section specifically includes a guarantor in the definition of issuer,' 2 and
for the purpose of the transfer of securities widens the definition further to
include all those persons on whose behalf transfer books are being kept.' 3
The Article does not indicate when a security is issued. A difficulty
exists here in view of the fact that corporate stock certificates need not be
issued for corporate liability to arise thereon. They are mere evidence of
ownership and are not necessary to vest in the owner thereof the rights of
a stockholder. 14 Issue and allotment are thus not the important moments in
relation to the transfer and registration of securities under Article 8 which
they are in relation to the creation of corporate liability. However, the pur-
pose of Article 8 being to create "a negotiable instrument law dealing with
10. Cf. E. R. Latty, supra note 4.
11. Section 8-201.
12. Section 8-201(2). This subsection gives rise to numerous questions. Must the
guarantor sign the security? Is it immaterial whether or not his "obligation" as a guarantor
appears thereon? Is a guarantor liable irrespective of having signed? I.e., is extrinsic evi-
dence admissible to show the existence of a guarantor, and the extent of his guaranty?
If a signature appears on the security, will extrinsic evidence be admissible to show it is
that of a guarantor? For, unless otherwise agreed, an indorser is not a guarantor, Section
8-308(4). Though in commercial practice, these problems will not prove insurmountable,
they should not have been left in a Code which attempts to clear up difficulties, The better
view appears to be that a guarantor need not sign. It will be possible to adduce extrinsic
evidence to indicate the limits of the guarantee, except against a "purchaser for value who
has taken without notice of the particular defence." Section 8-202(4). Where the guarantor
signs, the extent of his guaranty will generally appear on the face of the instrument. But
where the relationship of guarantor arises subsequent to the instrument being issued, no
such indication exists and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence becomes important. First
Bank & Trust Co. v. Siegel, 36 N.J. Super. 207, 115 A.2d 152 (1955). Courts are however
reluctant to admit parol evidence: Norman v. Beling, 57 N.J. Super. 575, 157 A.2d 17
(App. Div. 1959), rev'd, 33 N.J. 237, 163 A.2d 129 (1960).
13. Section 8-201(3). Placing one's name on the security as "authenticating Trustee,
registrar, transfer agent, or the like," will not result in such signatory becoming an
"issuer." The rights, duties and warranties of such persons are set out in Section 8-205
and 8-406.
14. Richardson v. Shaw, 209 U.S. 365 (1908); Lask v. Bedell, Inc., 91 N.J. Eq. 341,
109 AtI. 849 (1920), aff'd, 91 N.J. Eq. 341, 111 Atl. 936 (1920).
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securities,"'15 an issue of allotment, at least in the corporation law sense of
these terms, must be taken for granted. The question arises in connection
with transfers. Thus, when the Article refers to "issue" it really makes use
of a term already found in Article 3, Commercial Paper, "first delivery of an
instrument to a holder or remitter."' 6 Yet non-delivery is not a defence which
an issuer can raise against the purchaser for value without notice.17 A pre-
sumption of delivery thus exists, which becomes irrebuttable where a pur-
chaser for value without notice is concerned.' 8
We have already noted that it is usual for investment securities to in-
corporate provisions of other documents and that such incorporation has
often resulted in such securities containing "other promises" so as to take
them out of the provisions of the N.I.L.' 9 In part, it was to overcome this
difficulty that the Uniform Stock Transfer Act was introduced,20 so as to make
shares of stock negotiable by a transfer of the certificate. 21 The general test
under the N.I.L.22 is to test negotiability by looking at the document for
which negotiability is claimed and to construe it in order to ascertain whether
it is negotiable on its face.23 There is no reference to the document which
it might have been intended to incorporate.23 a Section 8-202(1) recognizes
the existence generally of incorporated provisions and that those dealing with
securities are aware that securities are issued subject to such incorporated
provisions. The subsection therefore considers the incorporated provisions to
be binding, even on a purchaser for value without notice, provided that the
incorporated terms are not in "conflict with the stated terms. '24 This provision
is, however, severely restricted. Thus, subject to the provisions of Section
8-202(4), a purchaser for value without notice is not given notice of any
defect going to the validity of the security unless notice of the particular defect
exists, i.e., incorporation by reference "of itself" will not suffice. This restriction
applies even though. the security carries a term that the person accepting
the security admits having such notice.
This leads to a consideration of the term "notice." The term notice is
defined in Section 1-201(25). This definition effects a change from the meaning
15. Official Comment to Section 8-101.
16. Section 3-102(1)(a).
17. The burden of proof lies on the person alleging that the defence is inapplicable
to him. Section 8-105(2).
18. Section 8-202(4).
19. N.I.L.; 5 U.L.A. §§ 1, 2.
20. 6 Uniform Laws Annotated.
21. Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 1.
22. Supra note 19.
23. Perth Amboy Trust Co. v. Modern School Ass'n of North America, 9 N.J. Misc.
368, 154 At. 418 (1931).
23a. See, however, Illinois, where the courts have generally permitted incorporation
by reference, Sturgis Nat'l Bank v. Horn's Trust & Saving Bank, 351 Ill. 465, 184 N.E.
589 (1933), provided such reference does not qualify or make uncertain or conditional the
promise to pay. Biegler v. Merchant's Loan & Trust Co., 164 Ill. 197, 45 N.E. 512 (1896).
24. Section 8-202(1). A "term" is defined in Section 1-201(42) as "that portion of
an agreement which relates to a particular matter."
9
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of that term under the N.I.L.2 5 and under the Uniform Stock Transfer Act.
Under these enactments the general approach is that of "the white heart and
empty head,"2 6 requiring actual knowledge of facts, a denial of which would
amount to a fraud, mere knowledge of such facts as would put a prudent
man on his inquiry being insufficient.27 This new definition of notice would
include not only "actual knowledge," but also the receiving of "notice or
notification of it; or (c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him
at the time in question he has reason to know that it exists." 28 This is of
particular importance to the corporate "issuer.128 a
In connection with notices of defects or of restrictions, Section 8-103
requires that a lien retained by an issuer has to be "noted conspicuously
on the security." 29 At common law, a secret lien would not be recognized.
Thus, against a transferee, a corporation could not claim to have a lien on
stock when such lien was not indicated on the face of the stock certificate.3 0
Clearly, therefore, where no certificate had been issued, an assignee would not
have notice of the existence of a lien otherwise than by virtue of the rules
of equity.31 Section 8-103, however, merely demands that the lien be "noted"
on the security. Some difficulty had been caused by the use of the term
"stated," as it gave rise to a controversy whether or not the whole content
of the lien would have to be set out. "Noted" indicates that, subject to any
provision of the relevant corporate law of the state, it is only necessary
to indicate that a lien does exist. Such indication must be "conspicuous," i.e.,
"so written that a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to
have noticed it.1132
Restrictions in relation to transfer are often imposed. The issuer 9 or
the relevant state law34 may impose restrictions on the transfer of securities,
a situation especially common in close corporations. Here too, the restriction
must be "conspicuously" noted on the security in order to be effective, al-
25. N.I.L.; 5 U.LA. § 56.
26. See Hawkland, Bills & Notes 194-197.
27. Graham v. White-Phillips, 296 U.S. 27 (1935); Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol
Bridge Co., 8 NJ. 433, 86 A.2d 201 (1952); Joseph v. Lesnevich, 56 NJ. Super. 340, 153
A.2d 349 (1959).
28. Section 1-201(29).
28a. Sections 1-201(26) and (27) indicate when a corporate issuer will have received
notice and demand due diligence in the transmission of such notification from the person
receiving the notice to the person in charge of the particular transaction involved. See
further Section 3-304.
29. This section re-enacts the Uniform Stock Transfer Act § 15 extending the scope
of its provision to a wider group of securities.
30. Drexel v. Long Branch Gas Light Co., 3 NJ.L.J. 250 (1880).
31. Lask v. Bedell, Inc., supra note 14.
32. Section 1-201(10).
33. Rosenfeld v. Einstein, 46 N.J.L. 479 (1884); Morris v. Hussong Dying Machine
Co., 81 N.J. Eq. 256, 86 AtI. 1026 (1913). I.e, the restriction must he imposed by the
issuer. The Section does not refer to any restrictions which shareholders may have agreed
to inter se.
34. E.g., Blue Sky Laws.
INVESTMENT SECURITIES UNDER UCC
though knowledge obtained in some other form will be binding as well. 5 If
there should be a refusal to transfer in circumstances where such restriction
is neither conspicuously noted on the security nor known to the person ap-
plying for the transfer, such refusal would amount to a conversion of the
security by the corporation, 36 and such transfer could be compelled under
Part 4 of Article 8.
Further defences of the issuer are set out in Section 8-202. Of these
the most important is the allegation that the security is lacking "in genuine-
ness. 1a3 This defence is available against a transferee or holder of a security,
though he be a purchaser for value without notice, i.e., it is a real defence.3 8
In this connection two situations have to be considered: (a) where there is
an unauthorized signature 9 and (b) where there has been alteration or com-
pletion of a security.40
(a) Under the N.I.L. a forgery makes the instrument totally inoperative.41
The U.C.C. continues this approach to a forgery.42 But the defence of "forgery"
cannot be raised where the "party, against whom it is sought to enforce such
right, is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of authority"; 43 i.e.,
generally, where an estoppel can be raised. The circumstance here envisaged
is where the previous conduct of the maker of a negotiable instrument is such
as to preclude him from denying the authority of a person to sign his name,
i.e., an apparent authority.
44
The mere fact that an agency exists will not be enough to raise such
apparent authority.45 There must be an actual "holding out" resulting in a
reliance by a third party in his dealings with the agent.46 In many cases,
standing by and allowing a person to give the appearance of such authority
35. Section 8-204. Note Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 At. 118 (1924)
where the transferor was a director of the company and thus had notice of a restriction
which was not noted on the security. The restriction must, of course, be a legal one.
36. Siegel v. Riverside Box & Lumber Co., 89 NJ.L. 595, 99 Ad. 407 (1916).
37. I.e., not "free from forgery or counterfeiting." Section 1-201(18).
38. Section 8-202(3); Buckley v. Second National Bank, 35 N.J.L. 400 (1872).
39. Section 8-205.
40. Section 8-206.
41. N.I.L.; 5 U.L.A. § 23. See also Ruben v. Great Fingall Consolidated [1906]
A.C. 439, indicating that this is a rule of universal application.
42. We are here concerned with signatures of the issuer and not those of an indorser,
as to which see Section 8-311.
43. Supra note 41. See Thompson, Company Law Doctrines and Authority to Act,
11 U. of Toronto L.J. 248 (1956) and Campbell, Contracts with Companies, 75 L.Q. Rev.
482 (1959), 76 L.Q. Rev. 115 (1960) for the approach in Canada and in England. The
basic distinction which has to be drawn is between a forgery per se, e.g., A, without au-
thority, signing a document as B, and a forgery where A had no authority to sign for B,
e.g., A signs as agent of B not having been authorized by B. The former can never be
validated.
44. N.I.L.; 5 U.L.A. § 19; Federal Deposits Ins. Corp. v. Bleakley Corp., 124 N.J.L.
445, 12 A.2d 700 (1940). It is clear that a course of conduct would be sufficient to estab-
lish such an agency. Silver v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 22 N.J. Super. 604, 92 A.2d 125
(1952).
45. Buckley v. Second National Bank, supra note 38.
46. Budelman v. White's Express & Transfer Co., 49 N.J. Super. 511, 140 A.2d 552
(1958).
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lhas sufficed to estop the maker from raising the defence of non-authorization.
The existing N.I.L. seems to apply a presumption that an employee of
the maker is an honest one, and thus only the employer or principal requires
protection in the rare case of such employee or agent being dishonest. Com-
mercially such presumption is unsound when it results in placing the loss on
a third party dealing with the employee or agent. The principal is in a much
better position to assess the honesty of his employees and agents and is much
better able to guard against their dishonest acts.47 What is more, it was he
who placed them in the position where they are able to act dishonestly. Thus
the burden should be on him rather than on the third party dealing with
the employee or agent. Section 8-205 introduces an objective standard to
-determine the liability of an issuer to a purchaser for value without notice
of the forgery or unauthorized signature. The liability of the issuer depends
,n his having entrusted the wrongdoer with the signing of the security, or of
similar securities, or with their immediate preparation for signing, or with
responsible handling48 of the security. Liability will also extend to the acts
of an employee of someone so entrusted, to whom these duties have been
delegated.
This makes more explicit those situations which preclude the issuer from
setting up the defence of forgery or lack of authority. It also places the
burden of choosing a responsible and reliable agent on the issuer. This re-
sponsibility is confined, however, only to an employee or agent who has
been entrusted with the duties set out in the section. The form by which
such trust is conferred can be of various kinds. It is no longer necessary to
seek negligence or an apparent authority to make the issuer liable. A diffi-
culty may be met in the phrase "entrusted with responsible handling of the
security." It will be for the court to determine how far that phrase refers to,
or is similar to, "scope of employment."
(b) The securities with which we are here concerned contain all the
necessary signatures, but are either incomplete or have been altered, and
the issuer desires to raise the incompleteness or alteration as a defence to
liability. In relation to negotiable instruments, the N.I.L.49 provides that a
possessor has a prima facie authority to fill in blanks.5 0 In order to be ef-
fective against a person who became a party to the instrument prior to the
completion, the instrument must have been completed according to authority
and within a reasonable time. A holder in due course may, however, enforce
47. E.g., by taking a fidelity bond.
48. Note here the similarity with "the Organic Theory" of corporations. Gower,
Modern C-mpanv Law Ch. 7, 8 (2d ed. 1957). The provisions of the Code do not
lover as restricted an area for under the Code rather minor officials of the Company
issuer could act so as to make their acts those of the issuer, it being a question of having
been entrusted to act.
49. 5 U.L.A. § 14.
.50. U.S. v. Sonnenberg, 158 F.2d 911 (1946).
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it in accordance with the authority actually granted, even though such authority
ihas not been complied with prior to his obtaining the instrument."'
The Code in Section 8-206 introduces some changes here. It permits
.anyone to fill in blanks in a security, so that the security is in the form in
which it was authorized to be issued. The section also holds the issuer liable
-even though the person who had filled in the blanks did so incorrectly, pro-
vided that the person attempting to enforce the security as completed is a
purchaser for value without notice. The right is thus not -confined to a "sub-
sequent purchaser. '52
Under the N.I.L. non-delivery is a personal defence.5 3 Neither would the
existence of blanks make the instrument void. 54 But, incompleteness due to
blanks plus non-delivery would amount to a real defence.55 Thus in Joseph
JHeimberg Inc. v. Lincoln National Bank,56 the drawer of a blank cheque was
able to raise the fact of non-delivery so as to defeat the claims of a holder in
-due course.5 7
The reason for this illogical rule in the N.I.L. is difficult to discern. The
rule has been ignored in Pennsylvania 58 but is accepted in New Jersey.59 The
Code eliminates this illogicality by providing that the existence of both, incom-
pleteness caused by blanks and non-delivery, shall not constitute a real defence
in relation to investment securities. Underlying this new approach is the
recognition of the fact that incomplete securities would generally be appro-
priated and filled in by employees of, or agents of, the issuer. Thus since it
is the issuer who reposes trust in such persons, it is only fair to let the issuer
.assume responsibility for the acts of his own employees and agents, even where
the issuer had not been negligent.60
Under the N.I.L.,61 an alteration which amounts to a "material altera-
51. First National Bank of Springfield v. Di Taranto, 9 N.J. Super. 246, 75 A.2d 907
(1950).
52. Article 8 also draws a distinction between "purchaser" and "subsequent pur-
chaser." See Section 8-202(2). By validating a security in the hands of a purchaser for
value without notice of a defect, even though it may go to the validity of the security,
'Section 8-202(2) appears to indicate the possibility of a "payee" being a "holder in due
,course." Cf. Sections 3-302 and 3-304. Such validation is subject to the proviso that the
defect is not a violation of a constitutional provision, in which case validation is confined
to securities in the hands of a "subsequent purchaser," for value and without notice.
53. N.I.L.; 5 U.L.A. § 16.
54. N.I.L.; 5 U.L.A. § 14.
55. N.I.L.; 5 U.L.A. § 15.
56. 113 N.J.L. 76, 172 AtI. 528 (1934).
57. I.e., the drawee bank could not debit drawer's account with the amount of the
,cheque. Of course if there would have been negligence on the part of the drawer he would
not have been able to raise the defence of non-delivery. But the cheque had been stolen
from the drawer's safe. See also Budget Corp. of America v. De Felice, 46 N.J. Super. 489,
135 A.2d 31 (1957).
58. E.g., Weiner v. Pennsylvania Co. for Insurance on Lives and Granting Annuities,
160 Pa. Super. 320, 51 A.2d 385 (1947).
59. Joseph Heimberg, Inc. v. Lincoln National Bank, supra note 56.
60. Ibid.
61. 5 U.L.A. § 124.
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
tion"62 results in avoidance of an instrument, except that a holder in due course
can enforce the instruments according to its original tenor.0 3 Of course, authori-
zation, ratification, waiver or estoppel could prevent the raising of this defence.
Section 8-206(2) provides that the alteration of a completed investment
security shall not avoid the security, but that the security shall be enforceable
according to its original terms. As a result, in so far as investment securities
which formerly came under the provisions of the N.I.L. are concerned, it will
no longer be necessary to draw distinctions between "alterations" and "mate-
rial alterations, '64 nor between "holders" and "holders in due course." The
first steps in this direction were already taken in the Uniform Stock Transfer
Act, 65 which recognized the commercial policy making certificates of shares
enforceable according to their original tenor, and conferred on the transferee
a good title to the shares represented thereby. 6
In view of the fact that the completion of an incomplete security may
amount to an overissue, it is important to point out here that the validation
of any security by such action is subject to the provisions of Section 8-104
dealing with overissues.
An overissue is the issuance of securities in excess of those authorized
by the charter or other corporate constitution of the issuer. 7 It is viewed as
the "most heinous crime a corporation may commit by almost every court
that thinks about mentioning the subject."6 An overissue is generally con-
sidered void,0 9 and nothing can validate it. Even though it be within the
powers of a corporation to increase its stock, it is not possible for the holder
of overissued stock to demand that the corporation amend its charter, etc.,
so as to provide for such increase. It is further submitted that even if there
is such an amendment, the overissue itself would still be void; there would
have to be a re-issue of authorized securities.70
Controversy exists as to the effect of an overissue on the liability of the
corporation. It is generally accepted that there will be a liability to the inno-
cent holder of such overissued stock.71 Yet what would be the amount of
damages? The prevalent approach is to assess damages on the basis of the
market price of valid shares on or about the date the cause of action arose.72
62. 5 U.L.A. § 125.
63. Smith, Kline & French Co. v. Freeman, 93 N.J.L. 45, 106 AtI. 22 (1919).
64. Section 8-206(2) uses the term "improperly altered even though fraudulently."
65. 6 U.L.A. § 16.
66. Pequannock & Wayne Building & Loan Ass'n v. Pritchard, 134 N.J. Eq. 563, 36
A.2d 755 (1944).
67. Section 8-104(2).
68. Note to the Proposed Final Draft No. 1, April 26, 1948.
69. New York & Eastern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Great Eastern Telephone
Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 221, 69 Alt. 528 (1908), aff'd, 75 N.J. Eq. 279, 78 Atl. 1135 (1908).
70. Gower, Alteration of a Company's Objects and the Ultra Vires Doctrine, 67 L.Q.
Rev. 41 (1952). The submission made in the test is criticized by Israels, 16 Law & Con-
temp. Prob. 248, 254-5 (1951).
71. New York & Eastern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Great Eastern Telephone
Co., supra note 69; Edmund Wright-Ginsberg Co. v. Carlisle Ribbon Mills, 105 N.J. Eq,
411, 148 At. 178 (1929), aff'd, 108 N.J. Eq. 206, 154 Atl. 632 (1931).
72. Douglas v. Mercees, 25 N.J. Eq. 144 (1874).
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The U.C.C. in Section 8-104 introduces a new method of dealing with
overissues. Thus if the security be "reasonably available for purchase," the
person entitled to issue or validation of a security "may compel the issuer
to purchase and deliver such security to him. . . ,,73 Otherwise only the value
last paid is recoverable.7 4 The question of "reasonable" availability will have
to be determined by the court. It is submitted that where there is no person
willing to sell such securities at a reasonable price, the security is not "reasona-
bly available." But, if the security is "reasonably available," must the issuer
buy such securities if not "compelled"? And, if he does, must it be accepted?
The section places in the person entitled "to issue or validation" the power to
compel the purchase. The price paid may exceed the present market price.
Would a refusal to accept entitle the person to the price last paid or to the
market price? It is submitted that "may" in this context will have to be
construed as a duty placed upon the issuer to buy such security, and the person
entitled to issue or validation of a security must accept it. Only if there is
no such security reasonably available, will it be possible to recover the price
last paid. 75
The requirement for reasonableness gives rise to a further difficulty. Al-
though generally a corporation has power to buy its own stock,76 usually such
power is restricted. Thus it is usual to find that such power can only be
exercised (a) in the absence of any restriction in the company's charter,77
(b) if such purchase is in the course of its corporate business, 78 (c) out of
surplus or accumulated profits, as otherwise such purchase would be a reduc-
tion of capital,70 and (d) provided that sufficient assets remain to pay credi-
tors.80 As against these requisites there is the express wording of the Code
demanding that the security be bought. Would this give rise to a conflict in
obligations? It would appear that the only restriction indicated by the Code
is that the security be not "reasonably available." Thus, the difficulties in-
dicated here will have to be reconciled so as to enable the issuer to comply
73. Section 8-104(l) (a).
74. Section 8-104(1)(b).
75. The offidal Comment to this Subsection states that this test is to reduce "specula-
tion by the purchaser." Admittedly speculation should be avoided. But what if the
security has increased in value since the last purchase? What if the security has been
received in the course of a testamentary disposition? Should the sum receivable in damages
be only the small purchase price? The Code seems to reach this conclusion and allows
interest only from the date of demand.
76. Such power does not exist in an English court. Companies Act, 1948, § 54, 11
& 12 Geo. 6, c. 38. A recent commission in the United Kingdom recommended a stricter
enforcement of this section and the raising of ths fine attached as a sanction, since, as at
present constituted, the section has no effect because the fine is infinitesimal in relation to
the amounts involved in "Takeover Bids." Board of Trade, Companies Act, 1948, In-
vestigation into the Affairs of H. Jasper & Co. Ltd., Report by Neville Faulks, Q.C.,
December 1, 1959 (51/358). It is likely that there may be an alteration in English law
on this point as a result of the recent investigations by the Jenkins Commission.
77. Chapman v. The Iron Clas Reostat Co., 62 N.J.L. 497, 41 At. 690 (1898).
78. In the light of the Code, would this become part of its corporate business?
79. King Machine Co. Inc. v. Caporaso, 2 N.J. Super. 230, 63 A.2d 270 (1949).
80. Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Co., 112 NJ. Eq. 34, 163 Ati. 140 (1932).
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with the obligation cast upon him by the Code. This could require a change
of a state's corporation law.
Under the N.I.L. a person can only qualify as a holder in due course so
as to cut off the personal defences of the maker where he takes an instrument
prior to its maturity.81 Difficulties are often caused by the case of acceleration
of maturity dates.8 2 It is to obviate these difficulties, as well as to provide
a trading device during a reorganization of a corporate issuer, that Section
8-203 provides that even though a purchaser takes after maturity, he will
nonetheless have protection from issuer's defences. This more realistic ap-
proach is only possible by a separation of investment securities from commer-
cial paper. Investment securities are often still dealt with on the market even
though they have been defaulted on. But, after a reasonable time, the fact
that a matured security is still in circulation "must give rise to the question
in a purchaser's mind as to why it has not been surrendered."8' 3 An issuer
ought to be able to know his liability on an invalid or improper issue. Thus,
where there has been no default on maturity, a purchaser is deemed to take
subject to the issuer's defences where he takes more than one year after ma-
turity. But should there be a default on maturity, then a purchaser has two
years from maturity during which he can still take without implied notice of
defences.8 4 This provision introduces an uncertainty into the Code. After one
year has elapsed, staleness will not be measured from the fact of maturity,
but from the fact-not generally within the knowledge of a purchaser, though
easily ascertainable to commercial men-that the funds were available to meet
the security on maturity. This provision is also unusual, in that it is one
of the few instances in the Code providing for constructive notice of defences
in commercial transactions.
III
An analysis of existing commercial legal rules will reveal that legal con-
cepts have not always kept up with developments in the commercial field,
and "how inadequate traditional legal concepts and doctrines may be when
a real attempt is made to make them correspond with the customs and prac-
tices of the 'market place'."' Part 3 of Article 8 deals with the questions of
negotiability of investment securities in relation to persons other than the issuer.
In analyzing the nature of the transaction by which securities ultimately
reach a purchaser, it is seen that in most instances the security would go.
81. N.I.L.; 5 U.L.A. §§ 52, 53; see also McCormack v. Williams, 88 N.J.L. 170, 9S
At. 978 (1915).
82. Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 747 (1919).
83. Official Comments, Point 1, to Section 8-203.
84. Compare the provisions as to claims of ownership under Section 8-305, which
cuts these periods by one half on the theory that a purchaser has more reason to suspect
ownership claims than issuer's defences.
1. Briggs, Article 8: Investment Securities, 21 Mont. L. Rev. 64, 75 (1959).
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through the hands of a selling-broker and those of a buying-broker before
reaching the purchaser.2 In the course of such movement, correspondent-
brokers and stock-exchange clearing houses may be employed as well, with
the result that only rarely would the purchaser get the same security initially
handed to the selling-broker by the seller. This would especially be the case
where the security passes through the hands of the issuer for a new or re-
registered security to be handed to the purchaser or where securities in fungible
bulk are sold. Can such transactions be termed a sale?
The relationship of broker and customer also reveals that it partakes of
various aspects. The relationship may include agency, bailment, trust and
pledge. In addition, where the customer buys on margin, the relationship of
debtor and creditor will also arise.3 Is it adequate to term this relationship
an agency relationship or a fiduciary relationship?
It is clear that existing concepts of sale and of agency are not very helpful
to us in these modern commercial relationships. A complicated set of rules
and regulations have been formulated by the commercial markets in securities,
to which the law must give recognition, lead and guidance. The problem for
the law is, therefore, to formulate rules which, though comprehensive, must
be flexible in order to give effect to the complexities with which the transac-
tions here involved abound.
Article 8 attempts to do this by recognizing that a security transfer in-
volves a multiple-step affair, and that at each step certain rights arise to which
recognition must be given.4 In the first place it is recognized that "purchase"
and "sale" need not be the same thing,5 though a purchase could include a
sale. Under the Code, a purchase is the acquisition of an instrument in a
voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. Thus, it is possible
that there could be more than one taking by purchase but only one sale. In
the multiple-step affair surrounding a transfer of'a security, there would be
many purchasers,--buying broker and their corresponding brokers and the
buyer, but not the selling broker since he does not acquire an interest in the
property-but only one sale, i.e., from the seller to the buyer of the security.
2. The transaction would involve a transfer from the seller to the selling-broker;
from the selling-broker to the buying-broker; and from the buying-broker to the buyer.
The fact that there are these three steps involved does not mean that three sets of transfer
taxes will have to be paid. Federal Tax Regulations 1960, Reg. §§ 43.4322-1(c) and (d),
43.6001-1 and 43.6001-2 (Fed. Tax Regs. to 26 U.S.CA. (I.R.C. 1954) § 4322 and § 6001)
indicate that no tax is payable on a transfer from a customer to his broker or vice versa.
See also Carlos L. Israels, 1954 (2) N.Y.L. Rev. Com. Rep. (U.C.C.) 897.
3. Note Denton v. Gurnett & Co., 69 F.2d 750 (1st Cir. 1934) where the court in-
vestigated the two theories which have become known as the New York Rule (majority)
and the Massachusetts Rule (minority). See also Smith, Margin Stock, 35 Harv. L. Rev.
485 (1922), and In re Codman, 284 Fed. 273 (1922), aff'd, 287 Fed. 806 (1923), cert.
denied, 263 U.S. 704 (1923).
4. See e.g., Sections 8-303, 8-306, 8-313, 8-314 and 8-316.
5. Section 1-201(32). The term "transfer" would have been preferable to that of
Cpurchase," for that term generally connotes a "transfer for a quid pro quo."
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The reason behind this distinction between purchase and sale was indicated
by Carlos L. Israels to the New York Law Revision Commission:
The purpose of it is in order to make possible the whole set-up
of the rights of the bona fide purchaser, the two attributes of nego-
tiability, issuers' defenses, which requires merely purchase for value,
and the defense against prior claims of ownership which requires the
bona fide purchaser, and you have to go through this whole scheme
in order to do that. If you get yourself complicated by, and it only
complicates it, I think, dragging in the question of title to the stock
itself, the shares of stock, I think you do nothing but make the draft-
ing of a negotiability statute intended to affect the certificate alone
that much more difficult.0
In the light of this new approach, can the retention of a statute of frauds
provision really be justified? The Official Comment to Section 8-319 indicates
that its purpose is to bring the statute of frauds provisions relating to invest-
ment securities in line with the policy enunciated by the U.C.C. in relation
to sales. It is to be regretted that the draftsmen of the Code were not pre-
pared to grasp the thistle and throw it out of the arborial path they were
breaking in the confused jungle of security transfers. W. D. Hawkland7 has
dealt with the development of the statute of frauds in relation to U.C.C. Arti-
cle 2, Sales, and indicated the diverse reactions which this most controversial
statute has evoked.8 Let us examine the need for such an anachronism in
modern Commercial Law. i. Introduced into English law in 1677, at a time
when it was not possible for parties to give evidence on their own behalf and
when, in theory, juries were still to act on their own knowledge of the facts
in dispute, it improved the then existing situation by admitting the evidence
of the parties themselves, at least in the restricted form allowed by the statute.
Is such a restriction valid in 1961? ii. Though the statute attempts to exclude
perjured evidence, it also excludes the truth. As FitzJames Stephens, J., wrote:
"In the vast majority of cases its operation is simply to enable a man to break
his word with impunity, because he did not write it down with sufficient
formality." 9 Is formality paid such high regard in modern times?
iii. The operation of the statute is lopsided and partial, favoring the
rascal. W. D. Hawkland'0 gives an example of how an honest person sending
a confirmatory note would be penalized in having provided evidence against
himself, but would be unable himself to enforce the agreement, for the rogue,
of course, would not leave himself open in this manner. Is this something to
be retained in the law?
iv. The language of the statute, as enacted in the Uniform Sales Act, is
obscure and ill drafted, e.g., much litigation has centered around the meaning
6. 1954(2) N.Y.L. Rev. Com. Rep. (U.C.C.) 1003.
7. Hawkland, Sales and Bulk Sales Under the Uniform Commercial Code (1958).
8. Compare, Lives of the Norths, 141 with Note, 43 L.Q. Rev. 1, 3 (1927).
9. FitzJames Stephens and Frederick Pollock, Section 17 of the Statute of Frauds,
1 L.Q. Rev. 1 (1885).
10. Supra note 7.
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of the term "memorandum" and what are the necessary ingredients thereof.
Should litigation be promoted by obscurities in statutes?
v. A statute of frauds is out of accord with the way in which business
is normally conducted. Thus FitzJames Stephens, J., as early as 1884, wrote:
"I am informed that in some large towns, Liverpool for instance, mercantile
men repudiate it in practice."'1 Should a provision to a similar effect be
retained in a codification which intends to illumine the legal paths of the
market place?
However much such an anachronism may have wormed its way into the
law relating to the sale of goods, what right has it in the law relating to
transactions in securities? In Humble v. Mitchell,'2 Lord Denman remarked
that he could find no case in point where the statute of frauds had been
held applicable to a sale of shares in an incorporated company. He therefore
held that such shares were mere choses in action and thus not within the
statute. Admittedly, in three earlier cases during the eighteenth century the
question was discussed before English courts, 13 and two of these cases seem
to imply that the court was prepared to hold the statute applicable. 14 However,
in Pickering v. Appleby, 15 all the judges in England heard argument on this
point in Serjant's Inn, to which the Court of Common Bench had adjourned,
and could not agree whether the statute of frauds was applicable to shares,
stocks, bonds, etc. As a result, the decision of Lord Denman has been fol-
lowed in England, and the statute has been held inapplicable.
In the United States, however, a different approach was adopted. In
New Jersey, for example, Van Sykel, J., happy at having found Lord Denman
in error, was able to follow earlier American decisions and to hold the pro-
visions of the statute of frauds, as adopted in New Jersey, applicable to a parol
agreement to assign a bond and a mortgage.'8 It is thus not unreasonable
that the statute of frauds provision of the Uniform Sales Act, 17 when adopted
in 1906, should define its scope as applicable to "any goods or choses ii ac-
tion,' x7~a making it absolutely clear that the statute applies to securities, and
11. Supra note 9.
12. 11 Ad. & El. 205, 113 Eng. Rep. 392 (1840).
13. Crull v. Dodson, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 51, Sel. Cas. T. King 41, 22 Eng. Rep. 44, 25
Eng. Rep. 211 (1725); Mussell v. Cooke, Prec. Ch. 533, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 49, 70, 22
Eng. Rep. 43, 62, 24 Eng. Rep. 239 (1720); Pickering v. Appleby, 1 Comyns 354, 92
Eng. Rep. 1108 (cir. 1721).
14. Crull v. Dodson, supra note 13; Mussell v. Cooke, supra note 13.
15. Supra note 13.
16. Greenwood v. Law, 55 N.J.L. 168, 26 Ad. 134, 192 L.R.A. 688 (1893).
17. U.S.A., 1 U.L.A. § 4.
17a. It is submitted that one of the possible causes which has led to the conclusion
that the Statute of Frauds provisions should be applicable to transactions in shares could
be that bonds had. already been held by American courts to be "goods." The idea of the
transferability of a chose in action such as a share in a company by mere negotiation of
the share certificate appears to create a conceptual difficulty. It is submitted that the
effect of making such negotiability possible is not just the creation of a negotiable chose
in action, such as the share in the company, by means of the transfer of the share cer-
tificate, a situation already recognized in the N.I.L. It is submitted that by conceptualizing
the situation in this way it would have been possible to avoid the confusion with goods
which has led to the applicability of the Statute of Frauds provisions.
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resulting in these transactions joining the merry-go-round of avoiding the
statute's application.' 8 The heavy morass in which this subject is steeped
requires no further elaborations. 9
Having been given the opportunity of avoiding all the complications sur-
rounding a statute of frauds, the Law Commissioners failed to grasp the
opportunity to emulate the English law and suggest the repeal of the statute20'
It must be borne in mind, however, that it took seventeen years for the report
of the English Law Revision Committee to be acted upon.21 We can only
hope that it will not take as long as that before some further alteration in
the Code is adopted which will remove the last vestiges of this anachronism.
Moving in the right direction, Section 8-319 tries to ameliorate the more
outstanding iniquities of the statute of frauds. There still remain two hurdles
to be surmounted by a plaintiff. He must produce proof sufficient to surmount
Section 8-319 before he can prove the terms of his contract. But in this.
respect the most objectionable term is no longer in this new statute of frauds.
It is no longer necessary to produce a memorandum; a signed writing sufficient
to "indicate that a contract has been made,"'22 will suffice. This will prevent
the rather fraudulent plea of confession and avoidance by which there would
be an admission of a contract, followed by a claim that the memorandum did
not contain all the terms thereof, so that the contract is unenforceable.23 The
important elements which must appear in the writing are the quantity of the
described securities and a definable or stated price. Once these matters are
ascertained it is easy for the court to discover the other terms of the contract.
Section 8-319 applies to all contracts for the sale of securities. There are
no price limits set, as exist in the Uniform Sales Act.24 It is to be regretted,
however, that the present law, which provides that if there was part payment,
or part delivery, the statute would be satisfied as to the total contract, is not
continued. Under Section 8-319(b), Where there has been part payment or
part delivery and acceptance of part of the contractual amount, the contract
is only enforceable to the extent of such payment or such delivery.2 5 It would
have been better to have retained the existing provision and enabled parol
evidence to be adduced to prove the totality of the contract.
The real recognition of mercantile usage occurs in Section 8-319(c).
18. Melniker v. Winter, 105 NJ.L. 278, 145 At. 318 (1929), Fenning Dornbush & Co.,
v. Greenfield, 107 N.J.L. 272, 153 AtI. 574 (1931).
19. See Hawkland, op. cit. supra note 7.
20. Law Reform (Enforcement of Contracts) Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 34.
21. Law Revision Committee, Sixth Interim Report (1937).
22. Section 8-319(a).
23. See Professor Llewellyn, 1954(1) N.Y.L. Rev. Com. Rep. (U.C.C.) 163. Section
8-319(d) would also prevent this, in that an admission in the pleadings, testimony or
otherwise in court, that there was such contract suffices. This would abpear to include
oral admissions.
24. Supra note 17.
25. In this respect the Code would appear to adopt the reasoning in Canister Co. v.
Wood & Sellick, 73 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1934) by holding such contract severable and en-
forceable as to the severed part.
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Brokers and others dealing in securities transact the major part of their busi-
ness over the telephone. .It is usual for them to send a letter of confirmation
subsequent to such telephonic conversation. To hold one party liable on the
basis of the letter and to release the other party on the ground that he has
not signed, has been shown to be most conducive to fraud. Section 8-319(c),.
therefore, enacts that a recipient of such letter of confirmation has ten days
within which he can object to the terms set out therein or he will be bound!
by the terms thereof. 26
The basic question underlying the negotiability of an investment security
is whether a transfer is subject to, or free from, adverse claims. 27 This in turn
is dependent upon the nature of the transferee, who is either a purchaser s *
or a bona fide purchaser. 29 We have already seen that a purchaser need not
have given consideration for the security, but could have acquired the security
by way of gift or in any other manner which transferred an interest therein
to him. A bona fide purchaser, however, will have had to have given "value"3''
on taking the security.
The N.I.L.31 in setting out the requirements for a holder in due course-
demands that he take the instrument (1) which is complete and regular on
its face, (2) before it is overdue and without knowledge of its having been
dishonoured, (3) in good faith and for value and (4) without notice of any
infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the transferor. Under the.
U.C.C. there is no requirement for completeness or regularity to qualify a
purchaser as a bona fide purchaser. In fact, incompleteness would not be a
defence to the issuer against a purchaser for value without notice, even though
the instrument had been completed incorrectly. The fact that an investment
security is overdue, will also not necessarily deprive a purchaser of the pre-
ferred condition of a bona fide purchaser. It is only when the periods of time
indicated in Section 8-305 have been exceeded that questions of implied notice
of adverse claims can be raised.32 In determining whether the security has
become stale, time is measured from the date the "principal obligation" be-
comes due. Thus, the fact that coupons attached to the security have not
been met on presentment will not bring the section into operation. This
26. This time is rather a long one in relation to the fluctuations which are encountered
on the stock exchange. On the other hand there is no need to reply to any letter where
there is no contract. For the fact that this hurdle has been surmounted does not mean.
that the actual terms of the contract have not to be proved and then, of course, the
existence of a contract would once more be in issue.
27. Section 8-301.
28. Section 1-201(32) and 1-201(33).
29. Section 8-302.
30. Section 1-201(44).
31. 5 U.LA. § 52.
32. As has been indicated in connection with issuer's rights, the period of time here.
is shorter on the ground that a purchaser taking securities after they had matured, would
be more likely to suspect claims of ownership in others than the issuer. The validity of
this reasoning is suspect in the light of Section 8-304 which enables an owner to protect
his interests, i.e., by indorsement on the security. There are, however, rights which cannot
be protected by this method. It is in relation to these that staleness will become relevant-
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clearly differs from the position adopted by the N.I.L.33 where a failure to
meet any one of a number of obligations due will be notice of a defect suffi-
cient to prevent the holder from being a holder in due course.34
Both requirements, for good faith and for value, exist under the N.I.L.
and under the U.S.T.A.35 No definition of "good faith" is given by the N.I.L.,
but that set out in the U.S.T.A.36 is very similar to the one given by the
U.C.C.37 There must be "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." Negligence of itself would not be sufficient to indicate dishonesty.8 8
It will in all cases be a question of fact.39
The 1958 draft of Article 8 of the U.C.C. does not contain a section
defining "value." Thus reference must be made to Section 1-201(44). There
is no presumption of the existence of "value" as under the N.I.L.40 Of the
various means indicated in this Section whereby value can be given, two
require discussion. First, what is immediately available credit? This question
is of especial importance in connection with payments made into a bank
account. No value will have been given until the deposit has been cleared,
i.e., until there has been a removal of any "flag" from the account, unless
there be a "binding commitment to extend credit." The mere fact that a bank
reserves the right to reverse an entry will not preclude the giving of value. This
is an alteration in the law of those states where the courts have held that
unless credit is absorbed by antecedent indebtedness, or exhausted by with-
drawals, a bank will not have given value so as to be a holder in due course.41
Secondly, Section 1-201(44) (c) states that a "person gives 'value' for rights
if he acquires them by accepting delivery pursuant to a pre-existing contract
for purchase." This provision makes it clear that a future obligation which
is contingent canbe changed into a fixed obligation by accepting delivery.42
The bona fide purchaser must take the security free from notice of adverse
claims.43 This requires actual notice44 and only rarely will such notice be
implied.45 The necessity for some clear intimation of adverse claims, as
33. Supra note 31, § 52(2).
34. E.g., Cramer v. Weith, 20 N.J. Super. 577, 90 A.2d 524 (1952).
35. 6 U.L.A.
36. 6 U.LA. § 22(2).
37. Section 1-201(19).
38. In many States, e.g., New Jersey, mere suspicious circumstances will not be enough
to show that a person had acted in bad faith. Actual bad faith will have to be shown.
Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201 (1952). Should there be
no reason for inquiry, then a person taking an instrument for value without notice of a
defect will have acted as a good faith purchaser thereof. Edmund Wright-Ginsberg Co. v.
Carlisle Ribbon Mills, 105 N.J. Eq. 411, 148 Ad. 178 (1929). But if the person taking
the instrument is intimately connected with the transfer or issuance thereof, he will not
be able to claim that he was without knowledge.
39. Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., supra note 38.
40. 5. U.L.A. § 24.
41. E.g., New Jersey, Hightstown Trust Co. v. American Equity Corp., 7 N.J. Misc.
135, 144 At. 599, aff'd, 150 At. 918 (1930).
42. Atlantic Pebble Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 89 N.J.L. 336, 98 Atl. 410 (1916).
43. Section 8-302.
44. Section 1-201(25).
45. E.g., Section 8-305.
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shown in relation to issuer's liens46 and restrictions on transfers imposed by
the issuer,47 is continued by Section 8-304. Under the U.C.C. questions of
indorsement of securities only arise in connection with registered securities.
The common law rule, "once a bearer instrument, always a bearer instrument,"
is supported by the U.C.C., provided that the security when issued was payable
to bearer.48 In the case of a registered security, however, an indorsement in
blank will include an indorsement to bearer.49 In this respect the U.C.C. 50
resolves a difficulty of interpretation between N.I.L. Section 40 and Sections
9(5) and 34. "The method of negotiation of an instrument payable to order
on its face is controlled by the last indorsement. If the last indorsement is in
blank, it is negotiable by delivery. If a blank indorsement is followed by a
special indorsement, the special indorsement controls. . . ,, ' "An instrument
payable to bearer on its face remains negotiable by delivery alone despite a
special indorsement thereon, but such special indorser is liable only to sub-
sequent holders who derive title through the indorsement of the special in-
dorsee. ",6, a But even though an indorsement will be ineffective in relation
to the negotiability of an investment security payable to bearer, such indorse-
ment may give notice of the existence of adverse claims. 2  Merely putting
one's name on the security, however, will not be sufficient.53 The form which
a restrictive indorsement must take is such as to indicate clearly that the
indorsement has not been made for the purpose of transfer. There is no need
for the purchaser to inquire as to the extent of the adverse claim, but such
intimation as would be given by such indorsement would show that the pur-
chaser, by ignoring the restriction, would be taking the instrument with
"knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted
46. Section 8-103.
47. Section 8-204.
48. An exception to the common law rule exists under Treasury Department Circular
No. 853 § 328, 14 Fed. Reg. 6171 (1949) which provides that United States Bearer Securi-
ties issued by the Treasury Department can be specially indorsed and will be non-negotiable
during their transit, so as to protect the owner thereof against theft, loss and destruction.
A similar approach is also adopted by brokers or dealers when sending investment securities
through the mail, by indicating the name of the addressee broker who is to have the
authority to fill in the name of the transferee of the security. In this way it is intended
to make the security non-negotiable during transit. This is, however, only possible with
a security requiring an indorsement to be negotiated. An explanation why the rule re-
garding "order instruments" has not been adopted in relation to investment securities
lies in the very nature of the latter. Investment securities are issued in large numbers
so that equality of treatment as well as continuity of treatment is desirable for the purpose
of bookkeeping. Compare Section 3-204 which adopts the rule regarding order instruments
to all commercial papers including those originally issued to bearer.
49. Section 8-308(2).
50. Section 8-310.
51. Britton, Bills and Notes 247 (1943).
51a. Id. at 245. This interpretation has the support of a number of writers, see
Hawkland: Bills and Notes, Cases and Materials, pp. 149-51 (1956).
52. Section 8-310.
53. Section 8-304(1) (b).
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to bad faith," i.e., he would not be taking as a bona fide purchaser.54 This does
not mean that a purchaser taking an investment security from a fiduciary would
be deemed to have notice of the contents of the trust instrument so as to be
chargeable with a breach thereof. Unless there be knowledge that the fiduciary
is using the proceeds for his individual benefit,e5 all that has to be considered
is the existence of a power to negotiate the security.50
The U.C.C. in Section 8-308(5) and in 8-301(3) deals with the situation
where there has been a purchase of and consequently an indorsement of a part
of a security only.57 This raises the question whether a person taking only
a part of the security represented by the certificate can be a bona fide pur-
chaser. The term used in Section 8-301(3) is "limited interest." Does this
refer to a quantitative or a qualitative limitation? If it is a quantitative
limitation, then although it was intended that the provisions of Section 8-301 (2)
should extend to a bona fide purchaser,58 it is clear that this is not the effect
of the wording of Section 8-308(5). The Official Comment to Section 8-308(5)
intends to leave the solution of this problem to the case law. But the fact
that there were other claims of ownership in existence would be so apparent
as to preclude a finding otherwise than that the purchaser would take subject
to adverse claims. A qualitative limitation, on the other hand, would not
prevent such purchaser being a bona fide purchaser. The answer would ap-
pear to be that Subsection 8-301(3), though intending to refer to qualitative
limitations, merely indicates the possibility of acquiring a limited interest in
the security and leaves it to Sections 8-301(1) and 8-301(2) to determine
the rights of the purchaser.
Before a purchaser can take an investment security as a bona fide pur-
chaser he must have had the security, properly indorsed where necessary,
-delivered to him. Both delivery and indorsements are required. Thus, should
the security have been delivered but not properly indorsed, the purchaser
will only become a bona fide purchaser from the moment he obtains the
54. Subsection 8-304(2) applies to both bearer and registered investment securities.
In this respect this section widens the provisions of the Uniform Act for the Simplification
of Fiduciary Transfers which extends only to registered securities, and rephrases the Uni-
:form Fiduciary Law. See, however, Israels, Investment Securities as Negotiable Papers-
Article 8 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 13 The Business Lawyer 676, 681 (1958).
55. E.g., by paying cheques made out to the trust into his personal account. Wester-
hoff v. Citizen Trust Co., 15 N.J. Misc. 202, 190 Atl. 84, aff'd 117 N.J.L. 453, 190 Atl.
.88 (1937).
56. There is no need to see whether the fiduciary is dealing with the instrument in
:accordance with the trust imposed upon him. Dennis Metal Manufacturing Co. v. Fidelity
Union Trust Co., 99 N.J.L. 365, 123 At. 614 (1923); O'Connor v. First Bank & Trust Co.,
12 N.J. Super. 281, 79 A.2d 687 (1951).
57. Such transfer of part of a security could occur either where part of the security
has been redeemed, or where the issuer intended such parts to be separately transferable.
Section 8-201 (1) (b).
58. Eliot B. Thomas, In re Article 8, 28 Temple L.Q. 582, 592 (1955) and Memor-
:andum submitted by Mr. Carlos L. Israels to the New York Law Revision Commission,
1954 (2) N.Y.L. Rev. Com. Rep. (U.C.C.) 892.
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requisite indorsement.5 ° Intervening notice of adverse claims is thus possible.60
But not until there has been a delivery 6 ' can there be a claim to the requisite
indorsement, for only then will there have been a transfer effective as be-
tween transferor and transferee. 62 To complete a delivery there must be a
"voluntary transfer of possession."'63 This requires both a tradition and an
intention to make a transfer, 64 so that in the case of a conditional delivery
no transfer occurs until the condition has been satisfied. 65  Once there has
been a delivery effective between the transferor and the transferee, then, by
virtue of Section 8-316, the transferee can demand the assistance of a trans-
feror in completing the transfer. But in the case of a purchaser who has not
given value, the transferor can demand to be reimbursed for his expenses. 66
The shelter provision covering negotiable instruments contained in the
N.I.L.6 7 is re-enacted in Section 8-301(1). Thus, provided the purchaser has
not been a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the security, he will
acquire such rights as his transferor had or had power to transfer. Is it
possible under this provision for a purchaser to acquire those rights which
normally apply to a bona fide purchaser? 68 We have seen that a purchaser
who acquires notice of adverse claims prior to the completion of the transfer,
e.g., after delivery but before all requisite indorsements are obtained, will
not be able to claim the rights of a bona fide purchaser. But what if he takes
59. Section 8-307.
60. Ibid.; O'Keefe v. Hill, 105 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1939).
61. Section 1-201(14) a "voluntary transfer of possession." The Official Comments
contemplate a constructive delivery. See further Sections 8-313 and 8-314.
62. The U.C.C. leaves it to the general law of the State to determine what would
be the effect of an attempted transfer of a security without delivery. Generally an equitable,
right would come into existence in the claimant-transferee. First National Bank of Fort
Lee v. Englewood Mutual Loan & Building Association, 124 N.J. Eq. 360, 1 A.2d 871(1938) ; Manna v. Pirozzi, 44 N.J. Super. 227, 130 A.2d 55 (1957).
63. Supra note 61.
64. Mere delivery alone will not suffice, Zoller v. State Board of Tax Appeals, 127
N.J.L. 376, 11 A.2d 833 (1940); nor will an indorsement without delivery suffice, Sec-
tion 8-309.
65. Introcasso v. Orrock, 124 N.J.L. 4, 10 A.2d 272 (1940).
66. No difficulty ought to arise in those cases where the transfer is effected through
brokers. The usual practice is for securities to be taken in the "street name" and then
to be transferred to the buyer. The New York Stock Exchange Rules also demand that
the broker complete the transaction obtaining a certificate in registrable form. What if no
brokers are involved? Once the security has been indorsed and delivered the transfer is
completed. Sections 8-307 and 8-309. Would it be possible for a purchaser to claim a
rescission when the transfer has been completed? It is submitted that Section 8-316 must
be read in the light of Section 8-306(2) (a) indicating that the transferor gives a warranty
that his transfer is effective and rightful. Section 8-402 sets out the evidence demanded to
support this warranty, and thus Section 8-316 entitles the purchaser to demand such
evidence for purpose of registration and can rescind if the transferor does not support
his warranty under Section 8-306(2) with the requisite evidence.
67. 5 U.L.A. § 58.
68. United States v. Perpignano, 86 F. Supp. 105 (D.C.N.J. 1949) seems to indicate this
possibility. In McAllister v. McAllister Coal Co., 120 N.J. Eq. 394, 184 AtI. 716 (1936),
aff'd 121 N.J. Eq. 248, 190 Atl. 52 (1936), the brother who claimed to have received the
stock as a gift from his father could not claim to have greater rights than those possessed
by his transferor, father. Since the previous owner had not transferred the stock to the
father with a donative intent, the brother could not lay claim to the stock. He had not
given value and thus could not claim to be a bona fide purchaser.
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from a bona fide purchaser? Further, the U.C.C. enables a broker to be a
bona fide purchaser, 69 and thus it could be argued that there should be no
right to reject a security in these circumstances, for although not a bona fide
purchaser, the purchaser would have all the rights of such. The New York
and the Philadelphia-Baltimore Stock Exchange Rules permit a broker to
return such securities to the broker who introduced them onto the market.
What if there be no possibility to return the securities, e.g., where they have
been obtained by the broker from another customer? It is no consolation
to the broker that he could attempt to sell the securities on the market and
use the proceeds to obtain similar securities as to which his customer is not
aware of adverse claims. But to grant protection to a broker in these cir-
cumstances would be contrary to the policy of the Code, which expressly
rejects the decision in Isham v. Post,70 which would allow a broker to recover
from his customer though he had failed to procure the exact instrument he
was asked to acquire. 71
A question which has generated considerable discussion is that posed
by Chafee in his article, "Reacquisition of a Negotiable Instrument."7 2 Chafee
maintained that the courts would hold that a person who once had knowledge
of a defect while in possession of a negotiable instrument could not rely on
the shelter provision in the N.I.L.,73 where his transferor is a holder in due
course.7 4 It is clear that a person having knowledge of a defect cannot take
as a holder in due course, but would such person be affected by knowledge
he received after he has negotiated the instrument, when he has an oppor-
tunity to reacquire the instrument from a bona fide purchaser? The Code
only deals with the case where notice of an adverse claim has been obtained
when "a prior holder." 75 It is submitted, however, that in these circumstances
there will be actual notice of adverse claims and this would prevent a taking
free from adverse claims.
IV
Although certain warranties are implied into every transfer of invest-
ment securities or their presentment for registration of a transfer, this does
not leave out of consideration the possibility of the parties themselves adding
to, or limiting, warranties,' provided that the obligations of good faith, dili-
69. Official Comments to Sections 8-302 and 8-304. The Code nowhere expressly
states this although an indication to this effect would assist. This is apparent, however,
from the position of a broker.
70. 141 N.Y. 100, 35 N.E. 1084, 23 L.RA. 90 (1894).
71. I.e., a security free from all defects.
72. 21 Colum. L. Rev. 538 (1921).
73. Supra note 67.
74. The one case to the contrary is the New York case, Horan v. Mason, 141 App.
Div. 89, 125 N.Y. Supp. 668 (2d Dep't 1910).
75. Section 8-301(1).
1. See Section 8-306 which sets out the warranties which are implied on presentment
or transfer of securities.
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gence, reasonableness and care as laid down by the Code are not altered.2
The Code thus attempts to leave open the development of the law, for "one
of the debit items to be charged against codifying statutes is the possibility
of interference with evolutionary growth. It is the ancient conflict between
flexibility and certainty."3 The course of dealing between the parties will be
of importance,4 though it will have to be proved that there was reliance on
the different warranties to enforce any changes.5
Section 8-306(1) deals with the situation where a security is presented
to the issuer for registration of transfer, for payment, or for exchange. The
position of a purchaser for value without notice of adverse claims is protected
in accordance with the approach taken in Section 8-301(2); he only war-
rants his lack of knowledge that signatures necessary for indorsement in the
transfer are unauthorized. The importance of this warranty can be seen in
that, subject to Section 8-311, an owner is able to assert that a signature, on
the basis of which the purchaser may have acquired the security, is a forgery.6
It should be noted here, however, that there could be situations which would
preclude the raising of this defence. Thus estoppel, contributory negligence
and ratification may prevent this defence from being raised. An instance of
contributory negligence is set out in Section 8-405(1), which provides that an
owner who has lost a security will have to notify the issuer within a reasonable
time or he will be precluded from setting up his rights under Section 8-311,
where the issuer has registered a transfer prior to receiving such notice. The
possibility of ratification is new. A Pennsylvania court has held that a forgery
being "an heinous crime" cannot be ratified.7 New Jersey courts have been
less absolute in their approach.8 But would not such ratification be void on
the ground of public policy? The Code in allowing ratification avoids the
difficulty which a distinction between a forgery and an unauthorized signature
could have led to. It would not be necessary to investigate the existence of
fraudulent purposes. By protecting the bona fide purchaser, provided he has
received a new, reissued or re-registered security from the broker, or has him-
self sent in the transfer and received such security in return while still in
good faith, the Code gives recognition to the fact that in the case of registerable
2. Section 1-102(3).
3. Manhattan Co. v. Morgan, 242 N.Y. 38, 52, 150 N.E. 594, 599 (1926). Compare
Edelstein v. Schular & Co., [1902J 2 K.B. 144 and Hoppel v. Cleveland Discount Co., 25
Ohio App. 138, 157 N.E. 414 (1927).
4. Section 1-205.
5. Section 1-103, Gluckman v. Darling, 85 N.J.L. 457, 89 Atl. 1016 (1914).
6. Section 8-311 refers to unauthorized indorsements. For the effect of an unau-
thorized signature on issue, see Section 8-205. The term "unauthorized" is defined in Section
1-201(43) as being without "actual, implied or apparent authority and includes a forgery."
This does not necessarily effect a change in existing law; e.g., Teas v. Third National Bank
& Trust Co., 125 NJ. Eq. 224, 4 A.2d 54 (1939).
7. Austin v. Marzolf, 294 Pa. 226, 143 Atl. 908 (1928).
8. Russell v. Second National Bank of Paterson, 136 N.J.L. 270, 55 A.2d 211 (1947);
Harter v. Mechanic's National Bank, 63 NJ.L. 578, 44 Atl. 715, 76 Am. St. Rep. 224
(1899).
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securities bought through a broker, the purchaser is not aware of any in-
dorsement that may appear thereon. He would normally receive a new or
reissued security from the issuer.9
In giving recognition to this existing commercial practice, the Code does
not leave the defrauded owner entirely without a remedy. Provided that he
has not precluded himself from raising the ineffectiveness of the unauthorized
signature, 10 the issuer will be liable for an improper registration of the transfer. 1'
In turn the issuer can protect himself by taking a signature guarantee under
Section 8-312 and will also have the right of recourse against the unauthorized
signatory.' 2
The importance of the relevant indorsements being on, or attached to,
the investment security cannot be overemphasized. Thus, Section 8-401 (1) (a)
imposes a duty on the issuer to register a transfer where the security has
been indorsed by the appropriate person, and Section 8-404(1) (a) relieves
the issuer from all liability to the owner or any person suffering loss as a
result of such transfer. The indorsement required is that of an "appropriate
person."' 2 Section 8-308(3) sets out who would be such "appropriate person";
whereas, Section 8-308(6) indicates the time of signing as determining whether
or not the signatory is an "appropriate person." A subsequent change in
circumstance will thus not make the signature an unauthorized one.
Section 8-402(3) (a) entitles an issuer to request the production of a
certificate of appointment or incumbency from a fiduciary appointed by the
court; such certificate is to be dated within sixty days from presentation or
transfer. A difficulty arises here from a confusion of the two fundamental
types of responsibility to which a fiduciary is subject. As was pointed out
by F. T. Christy: 14
The failure of many lawyers and legislators to grasp the distinction
between those two types is surprising and is one reason why some of
the statutes heretofore adopted are useless and, indeed, dangerous.
The first type is responsibility for unauthorized and void transfer,
hereinafter called a 'wrongful transfer,' and the second type is respon-
9. Cf., the position in relation to commercial paper which are themselves transferred
until presented for payment. The position would be different in the case of bearer securities.
10. E.g., through estoppel; compare Weniger v. Success Mining Co., 227 Fed. 548
(8th Cir. 1915) with Board of Education of Jefferson Township v. Union Bank of Dover,
16 N.J. Misc. 50, 196 Ad. 352, aff'd 121 N.J.L. 177, 1 A.2d 383 (1938) and note Gluckman
v. Darling, 85 N.J.L. 457, 89 Ad. 1016 (1914), aff'd 87 N.J.L. 320, 95 At. 1078 (1915).
Contributory negligence; Sections 8-311 and 8-405 (1) ; and ratification.
11. Sections 8-311(b) and 8-404. The owner will be able to recover a similar security,
or, at least, damages under Section 8-104.
12. As W. D. Hawkland stated in relation to Section 3-404(1): "Surely no social
policy is violated in making a forger or unauthorized agent personally liable on the in-
strument. The liability of the forger may not be worth much, but that is no reason not
to impose it. The liability of the unauthorized agent may be worth a great deal .... " Com-
mercial Paper, 33 (1959). There is no equivalent provision in relation to investment
securities, but the policy underlying such rule is a sound one and should apply here. See
also Official Comment 2 to Section 8-311.
13. Section 8-308.
14. Responsibilities in the Transfer of Stock, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 701 (1955).
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sibility for a transfer by a fiduciary in breach of his trust which is
voidable by the beneficiary, hereinafter called a 'transfer in breach of
trust.'
The primary example of a wrongful transfer is, of course, a
transfer on a forged instrument. Other examples are transfers by a
corporate officer or by an agent without authority, by a fiduciary who
has not been legally appointed or who has been removed and who in-
dorses the stock in the name of a decedent, or a minor or an incompe-
tent, or by a fiduciary without obtaining a court order where a transfer
without court order is void. These examples are to be compared with
transfers by a fiduciary which are not in the regular course of ad-
ministration of the estate or in accordance with the terms of the trust.
The latter are transfers in breach of trust and may be attacked by the
beneficiary or by a successor fiduciary as voidable transfers. 15
This confusion raises the question whether an issuer could rely on a
certificate of appointment or incumbency where the fiduciary indorsed a security
after obtaining such certificates, but subsequent to his having been removed.
The signature here would be an unauthorized one.' 6 There is, however, no
intention to relieve the issuer from the established risk of forgery, otherwise
than by virtue of the protection afforded by taking a signature guarantee.17
Should further protection appear essential an indorsement guarantee could be
requested, through not demanded, as a condition of registering a transfer.' 8
Most stock-exchanges have enacted rules for taking signature guarantees.' 9
Yet the meaning and effect of such signature guarantees is not always agreed
upon.2 0 Section 8-312 clarifies the position and indicates what are the
warranties of the guarantor. It clearly distinguishes between a signature
guaranty and an indorsement guaranty, which will warrant "the rightfulness
of the particular transaction in all respects." 2 '
15. Id. at 704-705 (footnotes have been omitted).
16. Section 8-311.
17. Section 8-312(1). The distinction between a "wrongful transfer" and a "transfer
in breach of trust," is emphasized further by Section 8-308(7), which indicates that a
failure to comply with a fiduciary duty will not make the indorsement unauthorized for
the purposes of Article 8. Various sections require the existence of an authorized indorse-
ment, Sections 8-301(1) & (2), 8-311, 8-302, 8-315(2), 8-401(1) (a) & (2) (a), and indicate
that the fulfillment of the fiduciary duties is not a necessary prerequisite of a valid indorse-
ment, Section 8-403(3 and 8-404(1).
18. Section 8-312(2).
19. E.g., New York Stock Transfer Association Rules, Philadelphia-Baltimore Stock
Exchange Rules, etc.
20. R. B. Tuttle, Jr., "The Signature Guaranty," a thesis submitted to 'the Graduate
School of Banking, Rutgers University, 1953, indicates the following results, in relation to
the understanding of 27 national banks of the effect of a signature guarantee:
A guarantee of: Yes No
Genuineness of signature itself 26 1
Legal capacity of signer 15 12
Authority of signer 14 13
Signature being that of person named on the face of the certificate 23 4
Genuineness of certificate 3 24
Correctness of transaction 4 23
21. Section 8-312(2). Merely placing a signature on the document may indicate an
indorsement; would it indicate a signature guarantee? The Official Comment seems to imply
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By giving a signature guarantee, the guarantor warrants (a) that the
signature is genuine,22 (b) that the signer was an appropriate person to in-
dorse the security 23 and (c) that the signer had legal capacity to sign.24 The
guarantee only refers to the situation existing at the time of signing. Thus no
liability attaches to the guarantor on the basis of supervening events. Capacity
may change, a change in fiduciaries may occur and other grounds on which
the signature can be attacked may arise.25 Also an investment security may
be outstanding beyond the period of limitation, and here, too, the guarantee
would cease to be effective.
In view of the informality which at present accompanies the giving of
signature guarantees, a review of policy would be advisable, particularly for
banks. The ultimate effect of the signature guarantee is to shift a substantial
area of liability from the transfer agent to the guarantor, and a guarantor
may not be prepared to assume the risks inherent in such guarantee. A further
question also arises as to the capacity of a bank or other legal person to
guarantee a signature in those instances where there is no interest in the
transaction other than the accommodation of a customer. Although this
question has never been raised by banks,26 a liquidator may have to raise it.
It is submitted that as by custom and practice banks have always considered
the guaranteeing of signatures to be within their powers, such powers would
be implied to them. It would hardly be good business, nor lead to trust, for
a bank to deny its liability on such guarantee.27 The approach would have
to be different, however, where an indorsement guarantee is involved. Here
the question of capacity really comes to the fore. Having a responsible
guarantor is thus essential. But not only must this be checked carefully, an
investigation will have to be undertaken to see whether, in view of the divergent
views taken as to such guarantees, the guarantor is aware of his responsibilities
and has the necessary capacity.
The U.C.C. restricts the warranties given by a transferee. 28 Although its
this, Jennie Clarkson Home v. M.K. & T. Ry. Co., 182 N.Y. 47, 74 N.E. 571 (1905). It is,
however, advisable to give some indications as to the nature of signature. See further, New
York Stock Transfer Association Rules.
22. Section 1-201(18). The term "genuine" has been used instead of "not a forgery"
so as to obviate the necessity of proving that there was an intent to defraud or to injure.
See 1954(2) N.Y.L. Rev. Com. Rep. (U.C.C.) 840.
23. Section 8-308(3).
24. This refers to mental capacity and full age.
25. See Section 8-308(6).
26. In three New York cases, Mohr v. J. C. Penny Inc., 242 App. Div. 385, 275 N.Y.
Supp. 50, aff'd 270 N.Y. 606, 1 N.E.2d 352 (1934); Schneider v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
169 Misc. 939, 9 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1939); and Rosier v. Gen. Gas & Electric Corp., 142 Misc.
596, 255 N.Y. Supp. 342 (1932) the banks did not raise this point at all, though it was
open to them to do so.
27. A ruling by the Comptroller of Currency, applicable to national banks, indicates
that it is an incident to the power to purchase and to sell securities for customers, for
banks to guarantee the signature of such customers, provided the bank has satisfied itself
adequately of the genuineness of the signature and the guarantee is limited to a guarantee
of facts. Digest of Opinions, Office of Comptroller of Currency, Treasury Department,
para. 230.
28. Section 8-306(2).
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provisions closely follow those of the N.I. 29 and of the U.S.T.A.,30 two points
require consideration. First, though the validity of the security is warranted,
its payment when due is not. The indorser does not guarantee the obligations
of the issuer.31 Secondly, how far do the warranties extend? Do theyxextend
to others than the immediate transferee? A registered security is not one to
which the N.I.L. applies, but it is the intention of the Code to make invest-
ment securities negotiable. Should not then the warranty run to an ultimate
holder? 32
It is submitted that a more restrictive interpretation would be more
consonant with the nature of the transfer involved, as Section 8-306 applies
to both a transfer of bearer securities as well as one of registered securities.
Such an interpretation does not conflict with existing concepts of negotiability.
The restrictions in the N.I.L.3 3 applicable at present to negotiable instruments
restrict warranties to the immediate transferee, and a similar restriction is
imposed by the N.I.L. on transfers of bearer instruments which have been
indorsed. 84 In any case, a reference back to the issuer for registration of the
transfer would soon disclose existing infirmities. All these factors would seem
to indicate that the warranties are only intended to extend to the immediate
transferee who, as a result of attempting to register his transfer, would im-
mediately become aware of a breach of warranty.
The position of agents and intermediaries requires special consideration.
Under the present N.I.L., an agent who does not disclose that he has a prin-
cipal is deemed to give the warranties set out in Section 65, N.I.L. If the
agent indorses the instrument, full responsibility would be implied to him.3 5
This is continued by the U.C.C.,36 but it is realized that intermediaries would
not normally be aware of the validity of a security. Thus, if it is known that
a person is acting as an intermediary, concerned merely with the delivery or
collection of securities, he will be deemed only to give a warranty of authority.3 7
In addition, a ruling long accepted il New York and Massachusetts has been
adopted by the U.C.C.3 8 An agent or bailee, who in good faith and without
knowledge of any lack of power in his principal, deals with a security should
not be liable in conversion. 9 The agent or bailee must have acted in a purely
ministerial capacity. No distinction is made should the agent or bailee have
29. 5 U.LA. § 65, 66.
30. 6 U.LA. § 11.
31. Section 8-308(4). Compare U.S.T.A., Section 11, which contains no express pro-
vision on this point and the N.I.L., Section 66, which does, whenever the indorsement is
without qualification and the necessary proceedings on dishonour are followed.
32. 5 U.L.A. § 66.
33. 5 U.L.A. § 65.
34. 5 U.L.A. § 67.
35. 5 U.L.A. §§ 69, 65, 63.
36. See Section 1-103.
37. Section 8-306(3).
38. Section 8-318.
39. See Pratt v. Higginson, 230 Mass. 256, 119 N.E. 661 (1918); Gruntal v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 254 N.Y. 468, 173 N.E. 682, 73 A.L.R. 1337 (1930).
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received a remuneration, nor on the ground that the principal was inala fide
or bona fide.
Although the reasoning behind this approach is understandable, it is diffi-
cult to, see why Section 8-306 (3) exempts an intermediary from liability where
the intermediary "has purchased or made advances against the claim to be
collected against delivery." In such cases, the intermediary would have an
interest in the claim represented by the security and would not be repre-
senting only the principal. He should therefore not merely be warranting
his authority. It may be desirable to grant an intermediary protection from
actions in conversion where the principal has no authority to deal with the
security. But such protection seems unnecessary in those cases where the
intermediary has a proprietary interest.
40
It is clear that a transfer, though appearing to be in order, may suffer
from such invalidity as to make it voidable by the purported transferor. Sec-
tion 8-315 provides an action to an owner who wishes to invalidate a transfer
as against the purchaser. The transfer may have been induced by fraud or
duress, or may have been made at a time when the owner had no capacity to
transfer the security. In order for fraud to be established, there must be
more than an expression of disappointment in the profits made by the corpora-
tion; 41 whereas, the test of duress is "was the person so acted upon by threats
of the person claiming the benefit of the contract as to be bereft of the
quality of mind essential to the maker of a contract thereby obtained?"
42
When we consider that rescission can be had, where the delivery had
been without authority, or after the owner had died or lost his legal capacity,
we are mainly in the realm of agency law.43 The U.C.C. in Article 8 extends
the protection granted to a bona fide purchaser of investment securities
beyond that presently extended to the holder in due course, both under the
N.I.L.44 and under the U.C.C.45 in relation to commercial papers. Thus once
a bona fide purchaser has obtained a new, reissued or reregistered security
40. A broker will in many cases be treated as a purchaser or even a bona fide pur-
chaser. But though he would be able to take advantage of the protection granted to agents
and bailees by Section 8-318, he is expressly excluded from Section 8-306(3) which deals
with ministerial agents who may claim a possessory lien on the security for their fees.
41. Compare Eddis v. Solomon, 8 N.J. Misc. 529, 151 Ad. 87 (1930) with Hager v.
Thomson, 66 U.S. 80 (1861). See also Riviere, et al. v. Berla, 89 N.J. Eq. 596, 106 At.
455 (1918).
42. 9 R.C.L. 716. Compare the application of this test in Hemenway v. Smith, 104
N.J. Eq. 529, 146 Atl. 301 (1929)Y where the threat of dissolution proceedings was acted
upon but was not such as to prevent the complainant from resisting such proceedings, with
Ryle v. Ryle, 41 N.J. Eq. 582, 7 Ati. 484 (1896) where such threats left the transferor
helpless and were the real inducement for the transfer being executed.
43. E.g., Manna v. Pirozzi, 44 N.J. Super. 227, 130 A.2d 55 (1957) shows that the
agent's authority to transfer shares to intending purchasers will not authorize him to transfer
them to himself on trust, or to make gifts of the certificates. Death of the principal will
terminate the agency unless there be an interest in the subject matter of the agency, i.e.,
not merely an interest in the execution of the power. Such is unlikely to exist. Other
legal incapacities would be infancy or mental incapacity.
44. Supra note 29, § 23.
45. Section 3-404.
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while still in ignorance of any defect in the transfer, it will not be possible
to obtain a rescission of the transfer even on the ground of an unauthorized
indorsement.46 In any event the bona fide purchaser will always be pro-
tected from claims for damages. In all other cases, however, an owner, who
is not prevented by acquiescence or laches from bringing an action, can obtain
a reclamation or at least damages from a purchaser. It is even possible to
obtain damages from a purchaser who has transferred the security to a bona
fide purchaser, though neither damages nor a reclamation is possible against
the bona fide purchaser. To summarize: it will be possible to reclaim a security
i. from a purchaser, ii. from a bona fide purchaser who has not obtained a
new, reissued or reregistered security, iii. from a bona fide purchaser who was
not in good faith when he received a new, reissued or ieregistered security,
but not iv. from a bona fide purchaser, who has received a new, reissued or
reregistered security whilst still in good faith. Damages, on the other hand,
can only be recovered from a purchaser, but not from a bona fide purchaser,
nor from a broker or other agent or bailee who has acted in good faith. These
rights can be enforced by an action, i.e., a judicial proceeding for recoupment,
or in a counterclaim, set off, suit in equity or any other proceedings in which
rights are determined.
4 7
To enforce any claims which a purported transferor or any other person
may have against a security, it will be possible to obtain specific perform-
ance and to impound the security.48 This will involve an attachment and
subsequent levy on the security itself. It is here that the effect of making
investment securities negotiable has been fully realized. 49 At common law,
shares of corporate stock, being intangibles and incapable of physical seizure,
and not being debts due and collectible from the corporation at the will of
the stockholder, were not the subject of attachment and levy. Statute laW501
altered the common law on this point and it became possible to levy on a
security at the domicile of the corporation, irrespective of the location of the
stock certificate or the stockholder. The introduction of quasi-negotiability
by the U.S.T.A.5 ' led to the requirement that the security itself be within
the jurisdiction of the court,52 so that it could be seized by the sheriff. Al-
ternatively, the holder of the stock certificate could be enjoined from trans-
ferring it, in which case it would not be necessary to obtain the surrender
of the certificate. 53 But, if the security is to be considered as negotiable, then
46. Section 8-311(a).
47. Section 1-201 (1).
48. Section 8-315(3).
49. Section 8-317.
50. E.g., New Jersey P.L. 1841-42, p. 130.
51. 6 U.LA. § 1 et seq.
52. I.e., the situs of the certificate became its actual situs. Elgar v. Mintz, 123 N.J.
Eq. 404, 197 AtI. 747 (1938), 16 NJ. Misc. 289, 199 Ati. 68 (1938). There had to be an
actual seizing of the stock certificate. A momentary holding and return would not suffice,
Mulock v. Ulizio, 102 N.J.L. 251, 131 Atl. 622 (1926).
53. Progressive Building & Loan Association v. Rudolph, 133 N.J.L. 204, 172 AtI.
884 (1934).
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the security itself will have to be attached, as otherwise the whole concept
of negotiability would be destroyed. Should the security have been surrendered
to the issuer, however, questions of negotiability will not arise, and it is
possible to go against the obligor under the contract to prevent him from
releasing a negotiable security onto the market and to demand that he hand
it over to the officer attaching or levying on the security. The U.C.C. realizes
that an injunction against the holder of a security will not prevent its nego-
tiation in defiance thereof and will not affect the negotiability of the security
so released onto the market. Section 8-317 therefore requires that in all cases
there be an actual seizure of the security before there can be an attachment or
levy, though an attachment and levy at source will still be possible where the
security has returned to the issuer.5 4
V
Under existing law, the difficulties surrounding the transfer of securities
mainly apply to those securities which can be transferred only by an entry
in the books of the issuer, i.e., registered securities. It is in this field that the
Taney doctrine1 has wrought its greatest havoc. The purpose of Part 4 of
Article 8 is to simplify the formal procedure surrounding the transfer of
securities, without, in any way, negating rights which might be affected by
an invalid transfer. In this connection it is important to bear in mind the
distinction between the validity of a transfer and its rightfulness. In regard
to the former, there is no intention to change the liability of issuer or transfer
agent. As to the question of rightfulness of a transfer, however, it is intended
to provide protection, so as not to make the issuer, transfer agent, etc. liable
for a transfer unless the circumstances be such as to indicate knowledge of
adverse claims.
The Code grants no protection in the case of an unauthorized signature.2
The application for a transfer need only be accompanied by suitable assurances
that the signature is genuine and that the person signing has the appropriate
authority. There is no right to investigate the rightfulness of a transfer,
and thus to demand an indorsement guarantee.3 This indicates that the right
to demand a signature guarantee does not shift the burden of inquiry from
the issuer or transfer agent to the guarantor. It does impose, however, a duty
54. It will still be necessary for the security to be within the jurisdiction of the
court. It is not possible to use this method to make the holder bring the security within
the jurisdiction. Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800
(1958). A decision of a Federal District Court in Pennsylvania, interpreting Section 8-317.
According to the Official Comment to Section 8-317, the Federal Government's power to
confiscate enemy property is however not affected by this provision, for the Federal Govern-
ment would not be acting as a creditor. However, Section 8-317(1) seems to be absolute
in its terms and only Subsection (2) refers to creditors. A provision to this effect in Sub-
section (1) would clarify this point more.
1. Taney, C. J., Lowry v. Commercial & Farmers Trust Co., 15 Fed. Cas. 1040 (1848).
2. Section 8-311.
3. Section 8-401 and Section 8-312(2).
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to investigate the ability of the guarantor to stand by his guarantee, which
in most cases means his financial responsibility.4
In addition to an assurance that the signature is genuine, the issuer may
also require an assurance that the signatory is an appropriate person,5 having
the proper incumbency to give his signature to the transfer, and, where there
are more than one fiduciary invblved, the issuer is entitled to an assurance
that all who have to sign have done so. 6 What is such "appropriate evidence
of appointment or incumbency" is indicated by the Code.7 The position of
the court appointed or qualified fiduciary is clear.8  In the case of other
fiduciaries, three alternative forms of evidence are indicated: the appointing
document; an assurance by a responsible person; or, in the absence of an
appointing document, any other reasonable evidence. A reference to such
document or other evidence for the purpose of satisfying the questions of
authorized signatures and appropriateness of the person signing will not result
in notice of the existence of adverse claims, so as to result in liability for a
registration which amounts to a breach of trust.9 In those cases where a
fiduciary, whose name appears on the instrument, attempts to transfer securi-
ties, there should be no need to make further inquiries, for the issuer can
rely on the continuance of incumbency until notice to the contrary is received
by him. 10
It is realized that circumstances may arise which demand that there be
further investigation to satisfy the requirement of appointment or incumbency.
The obligations under the Code are all subject to the obligation of good
faith in performance. Thus although the duty to register a transfer is stated
in mandatory terms," this must be read subject to the overriding obligation
of good faith.12 On the other hand, the purpose of the Code is to prevent
the present excessive documentation. Thus, if an issuer, for a purpose other
than the obtaining of "appropriate evidence of appointment or incumbency,"
4. Unless there be such financial responsibility the issuer would be taking the serious
risk of himself having to carry the liability resulting from an invalid transfer.
5. Section 8-308.
6. Section 8-402(1)(b)-(d). In so far as the appropriateness of the person signing
is concerned, a signature guarantee will normally have this effect. Section 8-402(1)(b).
In the case of an agent's signature it is possible to require that the agent submit his
power of attorney, or, where he represents a corporation, the relevant, resolution, duly
certified as such, authorizing him to act.
7. Section 8-402(3).
8. Id. §§ (a) (a).
9. Id. §§ (3) (b).
10. Section 8-207 and Section 8-403(3) (a).
11. Section 8-401(1). It is because many transfer agents have avoided complying
with similar statutory provisions that mandatory language is used to make this provision
effective. Note: New York agents will accept a transfer made in a state which has adopted
the Code and made in accordance with Article 8, and will not insist on further require-
ments. See New York Stock Transfer Association Rules Governing Fiduciary Transfers under
the New Simplification Statutes, Rule 1(3).
12. Section 1-203, see also Seymour v. National Biscuit Co., 107 F.2d 58 (3d Cir-
1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 665, where the issuer knew the transferee only had a life
interest.
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requires and receives evidence beyond that which he may require, 13 he will
be deemed to have notice of any adverse claims which such evidence would
have disclosed. 14 The type of inquiry it is intended to prevent would be such
as the Taney doctrine might demand; e.g., should the issuer demand to see
the will to see whether all taxes have been paid, he would not be able to evade
the imputation of knowledge of adverse claims, which an inspection of the
will would have disclosed. Any evidence demanded, which is manifestly un-
reasonable, would deprive the issuer, etc. of his protection against knowledge
of adverse claims. There is thus a strong deterrent effect intended here. This
is further supported by the right to refuse to submit evidence beyond that
to which an issuer or transfer agent is entitled. If an investment security
presented for registration be accompanied by documents going further than
would be necessary, it would be advisable for an issuer to return such docu-
ments unread, so as not to be deemed to have had notice of any adverse claims
contained therein, for argument may be raised as to the reason for such docu-
ments having been received. 15
In two instances a duty to inquire may arise. First, when a written
notification of an adverse claim has been received in time for the issuer to
act prior to issuing a new, reissued or reregistered security,16 such notification
must identify the claimant, the security and the place where the claimant
can be contacted. The requirement for a written notification should not cause
too great of an inconvenience.' 7 Although the common practice of commer-
cial men is to accept notifications over the telephone, such practice should
be discouraged. It could be argued that where the recipient reduces the tele-
phonic conversation into writing, this should suffice. But, in the absence of
such writing, and in those cases where it is the recipient of the telephonic
communication who raises the absence of writing, difficulties of proof would
exist. In any case, on the analogy to the receipt of stop payment orders on
cheques, it would be best for a claimant not to rely on such parol stop orders,
for there is no duty to accept a parol order.18 It should be noted that the
notification of an adverse claim must be received by the issuer. It is not
sufficient for it to have been sent to him.' 9 Secondly, there will be notice
of adverse claims where the issuer has acted in such manner as to be charged
with notice by reason of his having demanded excessive documentation.
2 0
13. Section 8-402(2) and (3).
14. Section 8-402(3).
15. New York Stock Transfer Association Rules Governing Fiduciary Transfers under
the New Simplification Statutes, Rule 7 and Comments thereto by F. T. Christy.
16. Section 8-403(1) (a).
17. Section 1-201(46).
18. Reinhardt v. Passaic Clifton National Bank & Trust Co., 16 N.J. Super. 430, 84
A.2d 741, aff'd 9 N.J. 606, 89 A.2d 242 (1952).
19. Section 8-403(1) (a). This Section follows the provisions of Section 1-201(26) and
(27), which indicate that a notification is only then received when it comes to the atten-
tion of the relevant person, or is duly delivered to the place of business of the issuer and
should in the ordinary course of business have reached the person acting on the matter,
in time for him to take note of it.
20. Section 8-402(4).
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It is usual for stop transfer orders to be given where a holder has lost
his certificate or has had it stolen from him.21 But anyone in fear of a breach
of a fiduciary duty can give such notice. The notice should be entered on
the register and no transfer registered until the procedure laid down by the
Code has been followed. 22
In case notice has been received in time, the issuer must notify the
adverse claimant of an attempted registration of a transfer. It will then be
for the adverse claimant to obtain a court order preventing the registration
of the transfer.23 Should it not be convenient to obtain such court order, the
issuer can protect himself from loss, though not from liability, by accepting
an indemnity bond.2 4 In those cases where the issuer has received timely
notice of loss, he must issue a new security.25 In view of the fact that in-
vestment securities have been made negotiable, it is necessary, however, for
the issuer to demand a sufficient indemnity bond26 and satisfaction of any
other reasonable requirement, such as an affidavit setting out the cause of
the loss. Two problems had to be reconciled here. The purpose of Article 8
is to make securities negotiable. On the other hand, the validity of a registra-
tion of a security has to be upheld and an overissue prevented. Thus, where
an original security turns up in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, such pur-
21. Section 8-405. This section refers to the security having been "wrongfully taken,"
thereby clearing up a doubt left by Section 17 of the U.S.T.A. whether lost or destroyed
would include a loss by theft.
22. The stop transfer order will remain valid until removed by order of the person who
gave the notice to the issuer. It will therefore not be possible to plead any "white heart-
empty head" defence here. Graham v. White-Phillips, 296 U.S. 27 (1935). A difficulty
is caused by the fact that Section 8-405(1) merely requires notification to secure the right
of the owner of a lost, destroyed or wrongfully taken security, without indicating the form
such notification is to take. It would appear, therefore, that any form of notification
(Section 1-201(26)) would suffice for the purposes of that section and of Section 8-404
(2) (b). Admittedly, the facts set out in Section 8-403(1) (a) would in such cases be in
the possession of the issuer, but a full notification in accordance with the provisions of
Section 8-403(1) (a) could not be objected to. This criticism also applies to Section 8-403
(3) (a), which merely refers to a notification in writing that there has been a change in
fiduciary without requiring further identification in the manner set forth in Section 8-403
(1) (a). It is to be regretted that some uniform method of notification has not been adopted.
23. Section 8-403(2). The adverse claimant has a period of thirty days in which to
obtain such an order.
24. Compare New York Stock Transfer Association Rules, 15, 16, 38, 133, 134 and 135.
25. Section 8-405(2). Note: This is made mandatory by the U.C.C. Compare Section
17 U.S.T.A. which leaves it to the discretion of the directors to issue a substitute security
without an order of the court.
26. The question of sufficiency of the bond raises some interesting problems. E.g., in
Davis v. Frazer, 307 N.Y. 433, 121 N.E.2d 406 (1954) it was shown that the value
of lost shares in the Texas Pacific Land Trust rose from $500 per hundred shares
in 1898 to $1,280,000.00 per hundred shares in 1952 when oil had been discovered under
the land. The bond might be very insufficient in such a case especially as some states,
e.g., New Jersey, continue liability in damages unless the bond had been ordered by the
court. (N.J.S.A. 14:8-43). Under Section 8-405(3), the issuer may have to produce a security
in the market or pay damages in the amount paid by the last purchaser, with interest.(Section 8-104). This may amount to a rather large sum and may not be ascertainable
immediately. At least the market price, if any, should be demanded, plus expenses of transfer
agents, transfer taxes, etc. It is clear that if the parties cannot agree as to the sufficiency,
they will have to have recourse to the courts. See also Re Petition of Union Savings Bank,
26 N.J.L.J. 236, 239-240 (1903).
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chaser can demand to be registered. The issuer can reclaim the replacement
security from the registered holder and will also be protected by the indemnity
bond. Negotiability of a security demands, however, that the registered
holder should be able to transfer a good title to the security in his hands.
It is therefore not possible to recall such security from a bona fide purchaser.
Under the U.S.T.A.2 7 once a security has been replaced, the original one
loses its status and any subsequent holder is relegated to an action in damages.28
The U.C.C.29 requires, however, that the issuer recognize both securities
as valid where both are in the hands of a bona fide purchaser and no overissue
would result from such- recognition."° In the case of an overissue, damages
will have to be paid to the presenter of the original security, since the re-
placement security would already be registered in the name of a bona fide
purchaser. There is no question of this amounting to a gratuitous issuance
of investment securities, for the issuer will have the indemnity bond as pay-
ment. There would be merely an increase in the paid-up capital. Investment
securities represent an interest in a fungible mass and are not a certificate
representing a chose in action limited in amount to the debt individually
indicated on such certificate. As a result, the consequences of registering a
transfer to a bona fide purchaser has enlarged the traditional principles of
negotiability.3'
Once all the formal requirements of transfer are satisfied, the transfer
can be compelled. 32 In return, the issuer is granted immunity from liability
to any one affected by such transfer. 33
Two theories have been advanced as to the basis on which it is possible
to compel the registration of a transfer. One 34 maintains that the claimant
"is the equitable owner of the security and seeks by transfer to consummate
legal title"; 35 whereas, Christy3" suggests that the real reason for this rule
27. 6 U.L.A., § 17.
28. The holder of the replacement security must have taken it bona fide. Edmund
Wright-Ginsberg Co. v. Carlisle Ribbon Mills, 105 N.J. Eq. 411, 148 At. 178, aff'd 108
NJ. Eq. 206, 154 At. 632 (1930).
29. Section 8-405(3).
30. Christy: Transfer of Stock (3d ed. 1958) criticizes this provision as "not only
unsound in principle but unrealistic in practice."
31. There would appear to be only two situations when it would be possible for a
bona fide purchaser to take advantage of the rights here indicated, without having Sec-
tion 8-311 raised against him, for he must hold the "original" security. I.e., where the
security had been endorsed prior to its loss, presumed destruction, or wrongful taking,
or where a mala fide person had acquired the security and had it transferred to himself,
a new, reissued or reregistered security being then transferred by him to a bona fide pur-
chaser, prior to the true owner giving notice under Section 8-405(1) or Section 8-403(1).
It is rather difficult to speak of an "original" security in such case.
32. Section 8-401. At least, it is possible to recover damages.
33. Section 8404. Note however that liability to taxes will remain.
34. See New Jersey, Lockwood v. Evans, 88 N.J. Eq. 530, 102 AtI. 19, aff'd 88 N.J.
Eq. 597, 102 AtI. 1053 (1918).
35. Id. 102 AtU. 19, 21. I.e., the issuer is the trustee of the legal title and can be
compelled to transfer it to the transferee.
36. Christy: Transfer of Stock § 265 (3d ed. 1958).
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is the specific enforcement of the contract appearing on the face of the cer-.
tificate, that the security is transferable. Be that as it may, it is clear that
an equitable action to compel registration of the transfer is possible, and it
is further possible to restrain intermediate dealings with the security until
the rights of the presenter have been determined.
One method by which it has been attempted to compel a registration
of a transfer is by mandamus. The use of this method is unwarranted where
no public officer is involved. New York rejects the application of mandamus
for such purposes; 7 Pennsylvania severely restricts its use.38 In New Jersey,
the courts have held that mandamus would not lie in the ordinary case,
but only if the issue is clear and there is no other satisfactory remedy available.
Since damages have in all cases been held to give an adequate remedy, manda-
mus has never been granted to secure registration of a transfer.3 9 The basis
on which such damages will be assessed must be considered. The general rule
is that an unreasonable refusal to register a transfer will amount to a con-
version, for it is an exercise of dominion over the security.40 The cases will
have to be reviewed, however, in light of the policy indicated by the U.C.C.41
Where other evidence as to value is available, the measure of damages would
not necessarily be the par value of the security, even though the securities
have a par value.42 Also, if the complainant claims to retain the shares, he
can only claim special damages and not the value of the shares. But if he
sues in conversion, the value taken will be as of the date of conversion, i.e.,
the date the refusal to register the transfer occurred. This will prevent specu-
lations as to whether or not an action will be brought, even though it may
result in a profit to the wrongdoer. 43 Where there is no market value for
the security, the court may consider the value of the assets of the issuer, his
recent liabilities, earning power, etc. in order to find a reasonable value.4
4 It
is also possible to recover dividends which have been declared in the interval
prior to registration, as well as interest charges on the damages recovered,
for the issuer will be liable for all loss resulting from his refusal to register
the transfer or from an unreasonable delay on his part to register the transfer. 45
37. People ex rel. Rottenberg v. Utah Gold & Copper Mines Co., 135 App. Div. 418,
119 N.Y. Supp. 852 (1st Dep't 1909).
38. Solz v. Exhibitor's Service Co., 334 Pa. 211, 5 A.2d 899 (1939).
39. State ex rel. Galbreith v. Peoples' Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 43 NJ.L. 389 (1881);
Bush v. Warren Foundry & Machine Co., 32 NJ.L. 439 (1868); Archer v. American Water
Works Co., 50 N.J. Eq. 33, 24 Atl. 508 (1892).
40. 54 A.L.R. 1157 (1928).
41. Sections 8-401 to 8-404. What had hitherto been a "reasonable refusal" to register
a transfer may now be "unreasonable."
42. Siegel v. Riverside Box & Lumber Co., 89 N.J.L. 595, 99 Atl. 407 (1916).
43. Alternate dates, such as the date of trial and the highest value between conver-
sion and a reasonable time thereafter, had been considered but were rejected.
44. Christy: op. cit. supra note 36, § 271.




We have seen that the Code imposes on the issuer the responsibility of
ensuring the honesty of his authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent
or other person entrusted with the signing of a security.' Such persons in
signing the security for the issuer warrant their authority to do so and further
warrant not only the genuineness of the security,2 but also that the security
will not result in an overissue.3 In its final section, 4 Article 8 assimilates the
position of the authenticating trustee, registrar, transfer agent or other similar
person acting for the issuer, to that in which the issuer stands in relation to
a holder. In this respect the liability of such agents to the holder is extended
beyond what is at present law in most non-Code States. The general approach
at present is to hold an agent liable for both misfeasance and malfeasance
but not for nonfeasance.6 It is submitted that such distinction in the law of
agency is most irrational. The abolition of it, albeit within the narrow confines
of the Code,6 is to be welcomed. The Code makes the agent liable not only
for a wrongful cancellation, wrongful registration of a transfer, or malicious
refusal to register a transfer, but also imposes liability where the agent refuses
to register a transfer, though all conditions required by the Code have been
fulfilled.7
It is clear that the presenter has a remedy against the issuer for a refusal
to register his security." But since the presenter will have dealt with the
transfer agent, he should be entitled to a remedy against him. In any case,
it is difficult to see why the presenter of a security should have to prove
malice before he can succeed in an action against the agent. It is the agent
who has been held out, and has held himself out, to have the necessary
authority to act, and if there be any right of indemnity in the agent, that
is a question between the agent and his principal. Also when we look at a
refusal of the agent to register a transfer from the point of view of the
issuer, we find great difficulty in seeing this as a mere nonfeasance as opposed
to a misfeasance by an active refusal. The whole distinction between non-
feasance and misfeasance and malfeasance seems to be not only irrational
but also artificial.
The relationship of the agent to the issuer is governed by the general
law of agency and is subject to any agreement between them. Such agree-
ment may contain provisions exempting the agent from liability. Under the





5. E.g., Heuser v. Reilly, 128 N.J.L. 533, 27 A.2d 4, aff'd 129 N.J.L. 388, 30 A.2d
27 (1943).
6. I.e., in relation to the holder of a security.
7. Section 8-401.
8. Section 8-401(2).
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been guilty of neglect in the discharge of his duties. In view of the more
specific nature of the duties imposed on the type of agent here involved, and
the fairly high degree of skill and care expected from him, the mere exercise
of "ordinary prudence," in the sense in which that term is generally used, is
insufficient. The agent has to exercise "good faith and due diligence" in the
performance of his functions. A compliance with the requirements of Article
8 is thus necessary. The agent must perform his duties in accordance with
reasonable commercial standards and must not insist on over-caution nor
raise supertechnical objections and requirements. 9 In this manner, it is hoped,
the transfer of securities will be achieved more smoothly and with less in-
sistence on those technicalities to which the Taney doctrine has given rise.
9. Official Comment 3, to Section 8-406.
